


1st Quarter 2011 35



UMRABULO



LET'S TALK POLITICS

Consolidating people's power for the national democratic society—



IN THIS EDITION

- Spotlight on provinces: Eastern Cape
- Reflections on Industrial strategy
- Celebrating unboken service to the people
- A different kind of ANC

TOWARDS A 100 YEARS OF SELFLESS PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE

UMRABULO

NUMBER 35 1st QUARTER 2011



UMRABULO was a word used to inspire political discussion and debate on Robben Island. This concept was revived in 1996 when the ANC published the first edition of Umrabulo. The journal's mission is to encourage debate and rigorous discussions at all levels of the movement.

Call for contributions

Umrabulo welcomes contributions from readers. Contributions may be in response to previous articles or may raise new issues. Contributions may be sent to the address below.

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CONSOLIDATING PEOPLE'S POWER FOR THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY


After the hard work of over fifteen years since we first decided as a country to bid to host the Soccer world cup, we proofed that indeed if we set our mind to a goal, we can work together to make it happen. The experience has taught us many important lessons – about planning and delivery on target, about the capacity of ordinary South Africans to set aside their differences and unite behind our team and our flag, and about the goodwill towards our country in the world. We will look back at this year as yet another milestone of democratic South Africa.

Another important event in 2010 was the 3rd ANC National General Council. This NGC focused deliberately and rigorously on the Post-Polokwane challenges of organizational renewal. It recognized that unless we arrest and destroy the shadow culture that is threatening to take over our organisation, we would enter our centenary year in 2012 as a different movement. The Declaration of the NGC was therefore clear about its marching orders:

Council had extensive discussions on the urgent steps that need to be taken to deal decisively with negative tendencies that are threatening to erode the character, culture and core values of the ANC as a loyal servant of our people and agent for progressive change in South Africa. Delegates stressed that unity remained the bedrock upon which the long-term survival and success of our movement depends. Such unity should be aimed at facilitating the central objective of building a better life for all. Council was frank in acknowledging that tendencies of ill-discipline and misconduct had set in within various structures of the movement. This 3rd National General Council, the delegates resolved, should mark a decisive turning point in addressing all the negative tendencies that eroded and pose the danger of eroding the organisational integrity and the very character of the ANC.

In this regard delegates stated without equivocation that there should be no confusing signals and messages from the leadership on matters of discipline. The responsibility to assert the core values and principles of our movement rests with every leader, every cadre, every member and every supporter of the ANC. These are, among others: a steadfast adherence to the interests of the people, unity, selflessness, sacrifice, collective leadership, humility, honesty, discipline, hard work, internal debate,

TOWARDS A 100 YEARS OF SELFLESS PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE



constructive criticism and self-criticism and mutual respect.

It is our responsibility, wherever we may be located, to embrace the core message of renewal and live the values of our movement at all times.

The issue of economic liberation, spurred by the nationalization of mines debate initiated by the ANC Youth League, was also foremost in the minds of NGC delegates. The reality is that sixteen years after our political liberation, our economy remains racialised, sexist and continues to marginalize the majority of South Africans. This, as we enter 2011, is the major challenge that will face our nation over the next decade and more.

The January 8 statement placed the creation of decent work at the centre of the tasks for this year when it declared, "2011 will be the year of job creation through meaningful economic transformation." It reminded us about the resolutions of Polokwane and how government's New Growth Path fits into this approach:

"The ANC said in 2007 that the creation of jobs must be the central focus of our economic policies and this was translated into one of our manifesto priorities in 2009. As a result of this, we have put in place a New Growth Path that will:

- *Identify areas where employment creation is possible on a large scale as a result of substantial changes in conditions in South Africa and globally*
- *Develop a policy package to facilitate employment creation in these areas, through:*
 - o *A comprehensive drive to enhance both social equity and competitiveness.*
 - o *Systemic changes to mobilise domestic investment around activities that can create sustainable employment, and*
 - o *Strong social dialogue to focus all stakeholders on encouraging growth in employment-creating activities.*

Thus, central to the realization of a national democratic society, is the issue of economic liberation and in particular addressing unemployment, poverty and inequality. Our orders for this year are therefore clear!

Let us make 2011 the year of consolidating people's power for the national democratic society! Towards 100 years of selfless people's struggles.

PROVINCIAL
Spotlight

E Cape



Eastern Cape: activism and unity

For this edition of Spotlight on Provinces, Umrabulo spoke to the Provincial Secretary of Eastern Cape, OSCAR MABUYANE.

Umrabulo: *Since the relaunch of the ANC as a mass legal movement after its unbanning in 1990, what are the major characteristics of the movement in the Eastern Cape and how have these developed and changed over the twenty year period?*

Mabuyane: The unbanning of the ANC heralded a new era in the politics of the province, the people warmly received and accepted the ANC as their political home. The rebuilding of the ANC as a legal organisation happened in the context of three distinct and polarised regions namely the Transkei, Border (Ciskei and parts of RSA), Port Elizabeth and other Cape Provincial Administration areas. The Transkei was a semi-liberated zone with rooted underground structures while the Border and

Port Elizabeth regions were still under the grip of the repressive regimes of Ciskei and the Republic of South Africa. In addition, high levels of mass mobilisation through the UDF, trade unions and civic organisations defined both these regions.

During the early years of unbanning, the province was characterized by vibrant political activity in setting up organisational structures and mobilising the people (including those who were puppets of the previous apartheid and Bantustan regimes). The leaders of the movement who were in the country, from exile and the underground led discussions in structures and communities on issues such as: What is the ANC, negotiations as a site of struggle, pillars of our revolution, the nature and

character of the democratic state, organisational discipline, etc. All this happened within the context of continued repression, attempts to derail the democratic project, negotiations and the ANC preparing to govern. The rebuilding of the organisation also included the mammoth task of preparing for elections, setting up our election machinery and preparing millions of people who were illiterate and had never voted in their lifetime.

How did the ANC manage those first few years after 27 April 1994 and how has this impacted on its character?

The period post the unbanning but preceding the elections imposed on the ANC a unique character of a liberation movement thinking like government, and providing leadership to all the people of the province whilst not yet in power. This leadership to society ensured that the 1994 democratic elections were delivered despite attempts to derail the democratic breakthrough.

1994 saw the ushering in of a new era of reconstruction and development. In the movement, we had to unite three polarised regions with different organisational cultures into a united province with a common identity. In governance we had to integrate three administrations (Transkei, Ciskei, RSA) into a single, systematic and non-racial provincial administration.

From the onset, the need to speedily consolidate the three administrations was necessary to immediately and concurrently engage in the process of reconstruction and development of the three unevenly developed regions. In this process, the apartheid's divide and rule tactic wanted to manifest itself through people from respective former administrations wanting to skew provincial resources in the favour of their former regions both in government and internally in the organisation. The organisation was able to respond to this and forged ahead with uniting the divided people of our province. The twin character of being a political party leading government and a liberation movement leading the entire society imposed new challenges on the movement. For example, the need to focus on building the democratic state left the organization depleted, particularly in terms of human resources.

As expected, the first few years were characterised by the ANC trying to find its firm grip on governance while concurrently leading the reconstruction and development of the province, this to a larger extent had an impact on some of our development targets not being met. The apartheid spatial development patterns saw systemic underdevelopment in the former Bantustans - particularly in the former Transkei - resulting in high

levels of economic and social infrastructure backlogs. The glaring reality was and remains that the resources from the provincial fiscus are not enough to address this endemic apartheid legacy. However, interventions by our government over the past 20 years had a significant impact both at a qualitative and quantitative level in addressing some of the critical challenges facing the poorest of the poor. These include amongst others access to clean water, sanitation, roads, electricity, health, education and housing in line with millennium development goals.

The lack of investment by the private sector and continued de-industrialisation of our province has resulted in government being the major source of employment and access to other economic resources. This reality has led to a high level of contestation for government positions. The tendency to use the ANC as a ladder to access these positions has grown, undermining organisational discipline and creating divisions in the organisation for selfish individual interests. These unintended consequences of assuming state power had an adverse effect on the unity and cohesion in the province, but we are now ushering in a period of renewal of the values and traditions, underpinned by a focused and rigorous political education programme.

How is the national question refelcted in the province and how does the movement address it?

The national question is a complex of socio-economic and political power dynamics. The Eastern Cape as a province is consistent with the national trends in terms of demographic composition of our population, in that it is predominantly black in the eastern regions of our province with a mixture of coloureds and whites as you gravitate towards the western side. The province was historically comprised of the two Bantustans (Transkei & Ciskei) and the Cape administration. The character of these Bantustans was and remains rural, more than 90% of its inhabitants are blacks, with high levels of illiteracy, underdevelopment, unemployment. The oppressive regimes of these Bantustans, assisted by the apartheid state, systematically divided the people exploiting both the tribal and ethnic nature of the area. This divide and rule approach was effective in polarising the people of the province.

On the other hand, the Cape administration was less rural and a hub of economic activity. Relatively speaking, levels of unemployment in this part of the province were low due (largely) to the automobile industry. In this part of the province, the national question also expressed itself in places of employment and in all other socio-economic activities. Repressive laws like the Group Areas

Act found more expression in this part of the province as this composed of a fair number of whites relative to the Bantustans. In this Cape Administration, delivery of basic services to the people was glaringly along colour lines, quality of services rendered to Whites was superior to those of Coloureds and Africans, and those to coloured population better off to those of Africans.

Informed by this historical legacy, the majority of its inhabitants (Blacks) remain at the periphery of the economy whilst relying largely on the government for household subsistence. The provincial economy remains racially fragmented and in particular skewed in favour of white males, therefore addressing the national question in the province includes inter alia de-racialising the economy. Our provincial government through our provincial growth and development plan, the industrial policy, preferential procurement and broad based economic empowerment is making significant strides in redressing this legacy of apartheid's racialised economy.

The province consistent with the strategic objective of the ANC of uniting the black people in general and the African majority in particular continues to pursue the unity of our people by addressing and dealing directly with the question of tribalism and regionalism. Since 1990 we have engaged in a process of realigning the province breaking down the apartheid racialised spatial configuration and demarcation, though this might have looked as a mechanical process at a face value, there was a systematic engagement amongst the members of the ANC premised from their different experiences of the national question and thus enhancing its comprehension thereof. Also a systematic engagement with minority groupings is ongoing to properly and accurately locate and interpret the strategic objective of the ANC towards addressing the National Question. Within the organisation there is always an attempt to ensure the demographic representation of the province in all our structures.

With all our efforts to address the national question in the province the engagement and mobilisation of minorities behind a common vision and patriotism remains a challenge. There are some pockets of persistent racism particularly in small rural farming towns where apartheid economic fault lines remain intact. Within the movement the interpretation of Blacks in general and Africans in particular also remains a challenge as there is a tendency towards a narrow and simplistic interpretation to mean Africans' grievances will be addressed first and then Coloureds & Indians later. With all these challenges however, acknowledging this diversity in the province assists us to be vigilant against mobilisation of the people along ethnic

and racial lines in pursuance of narrow selfish agendas.

The Eastern Cape is known for producing many leaders and intellectuals of the movements, what contribution can and will it make to Centenary celebrations of the ANC?

The formation of the ANC in 1912 is a historical event that changed the face of Africa and as we will be celebrating 100 years of existence on the 8th of January 2012 we will mark a great milestone as the oldest liberation movement in Africa. As a province we will indeed pull out all the stops to ensure this great milestone is celebrated and acknowledged by all the people of the province. Our approach to the centenary celebrations is informed by what President Oliver Tambo once said in London in 1981 on the event of the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the SACP that "For the revolutionary movement, anniversaries cannot only celebrate the past. We must recall and acclaim our history, but more importantly, we must use the past to arm ourselves for the future: to learn lessons and to strengthen our resolve and commitment". It is in this vein that we plan to use the centenary celebrations to recall, acclaim and celebrate our history and contribution to the struggle as a province.

The Eastern Cape, like the other provinces, had its fair contribution to the struggle for liberation in the country starting from the meetings that conceived the idea of forming a national organisation in Queenstown, to providing the movement with some of its outstanding leaders and the contribution in debates that shaped progressive policy positions of the ANC. In contributing towards ensuring that these celebrations are also used to inform and arm us for the future we will do the following:

- Ensure the realisation of the historic dream of reaching the target of a million members by 2012 is achieved and exceeded.
- Engage in consistent, vigorous and focused political education that ensures that ANC members know the ANC, its history and its future.
- Develop a structured programme to celebrate key milestones and dates as a build up; and
- The mobilisation of the broader provincial citizens to celebrate with the people's movement.
- Publishing a book on the history of the ANC and the struggle in the Eastern Cape.
- Public lectures on the history of the ANC and memorial lectures of former leaders will be organised across the province with the participation of our Veterans and former MK soldiers to give an anecdotal ac-

count of this history. These lectures will also be transcribed and documented for future generations.

- A 20-year review of the province, outlining all the achievements of the government since the ANC took over the province will also be done and distributed across the province in all three official languages dominant in the province.

We will also use the ANC centenary not only to celebrate directly the history of the ANC but to celebrate the entire history of the our people's struggle from the resistance to colonialism up until the current epoch.

Can you give us a sense of the economy of the province, whether we have a provincial growth and developmental strategy, where does the ANC see the province over the next twenty years?

The Eastern Cape economy remains insufficiently transformed and dominated by finance, government services, retail trade and the automotive sector. Industries like tourism and hospitality, agriculture and agro-processing, forestry, infrastructure development led by construction and some limited mining activities also contribute to the provincial economy. The two Industrial Development Zones - COEGA and the East London IDZ - are the main pillars in driving industrial development in the E Cape even though the past 20 years has also seen high levels of de-industrialization in the non-auto manufacturing sector. Severe structural and systemic weaknesses related to continued patterns of underdevelopment in the former Bantustans and the continued marginal position of the province in the national spatial economy continue to characterise the provincial economy. Effectively, poverty and unemployment remain rife especially in rural areas, the economy is hugely driven by the public spending, although there is some relative growth in private investment.

Statistics reveal that the Eastern Cape has been one of the heavily affected province by the economic recession, with a total of about 200 000 jobs lost in the formal sector (mostly in manufacturing) and about 24 000 jobs in the informal sector. There are some signs that the recession is formally over and the automotive sector (especially VW and Mercedes Benz) is showing good recovery. The effect of the global economic crisis has been to expedite the collapse of industries that have already experienced challenges of competitiveness and profitability. The crisis has also triggered companies to move ahead with restructuring, retooling and con-

solidation plans, which in most cases has led to job losses. In the province measures announced through the NEDLAC Framework Agreement and implemented through the IDC and CCMA have not realized the intended outcome of saving jobs. The recession has shown us quite clearly that the provincial and local government simply do not have the resources nor the instruments to make the necessary interventions thus we continue to be vulnerable as a result of our near whole-scale dependence on the auto sector.

In the Eastern Cape today about fifty seven per cent (57%) of households depend on social grants and there are massive infrastructure backlogs with an estimated cost of R80 billion in the former Transkei alone, our underdeveloped transport network negatively impacts economic growth and linkages and in ending social marginalisation.

The province has a Provincial Growth and Development Plan (PGDP), which outlines the role of the ANC-led Government in the Province in terms of intervention areas for the short-term period until 2014 and a process is underway to review the PGDP and develop a 2030 Development Plan for the Eastern Cape. In the next 20 years we want to focus on industrialisation and diversifying our economy away from dependence on the auto sector while consolidating the auto sector. We plan to develop major anchor projects ("lead geese") around which resources (including private investment) and delivery capacity can be crowded in. Some of these projects are the Wild Coast Development Corridor, Mzimvubu Basin (Water Catchment), East London Port and Industrial Development Zone (IDZ), Coega as an International Transshipment hub and the relocation of the manganese terminal to Coega, Coega IDZ with the Project Mthombo oil refinery, the three Airports anchored by the PE International Airport Project.

Critical to the success of our plans will be the support and resource injection from the national government, state owned enterprises and development finance institutions as in the past their investment in the province has been minimal, our research shows that we are getting just 2,5% of the national infrastructure spend while we make up 13,5% of the national population. We must therefore be more upfront in determining how part of the R3,6 billion that has been set aside for the Industrial Policy Action Plan 2 (IPAP2) over the MTEF will be distributed to the province, and we will be proactive in leveraging such resources as it is clear that by virtue of our historical position, we are seriously lagging behind in state capital investments. In order to reposition the provincial economy within the new national growth path, we will need significant investments in the future infrastructure ports, road, rail, energy, water storage

and ICT plans by the national government

The Eastern Cape is predominantly rural, with two former bantustans, is there a rural development strategy for the province and what are the main pillars?

The Eastern Cape is characterized by the persistence of structural poverty and massive geo-spatial inequalities. Historically and to date, underdevelopment and poverty increases exponentially as one move from west to east. Nelson Mandela Bay Metro and Buffalo City generate 72% of provincial GDP, although most of the province's population resides in the former Bantustan areas. Recent Treasury data shows that per capita spending by municipalities is R400 in the former Bantustans and R4000 in the metropolitan areas of the province. The question of the development of the rural areas is therefore a pressing challenge in the province if we are to fundamentally change people's lives for the better.

In the aftermath of Polokwane's prioritisation of rural development, the province embarked on an extensive consultative and research process to formulate a rural development strategy. In 2009, the provincial government launched the new provincial rural development strategy. During this current term of government, a new department of Agriculture and Rural Development has been established to give impetus to rural development. The province is also finalising the establishment of a rural development agency to drive implementation of the strategy.

The rural development strategy has six main pillars:

- Implementation of accelerated land reform programme
- Using agrarian reform as a key driver of rural development
- Building a non-farm rural economy
- Development of enabling economic and social infrastructure
- Implementing social protection measures and improving service delivery

Eastern Cape and the World Cup, how did the province experience it and what were the major highlights?

One of the host cities for 2010 World Cup, Port Elizabeth is based in the province but the experience of the world cup was not limited to the host city, the euphoria and excitement spread across the entire province. A number of our municipalities had Public Viewing Areas (PVA's) and other initiatives to promote the world cup. This ensured that all the citizens of the province were feeling it quite

clearly that the world cup is here including those in the rural areas. One of the lasting legacies of the World Cup would be its ability to unite our people across racial, ethnic and regional lines and its contribution to building a common patriotism. The World Cup created a number of temporary jobs from the informal sector (street vendors), the hospitality industry and the formal economy, it also provided an opportunity for the province to improve its infrastructure and showcase its tourism potential to the world. The World Cup also proven province's ability to be a host to major sporting tournaments that can contribute immensely to sport development in the province.

The 2010 World Cup has effectively left a legacy of improved infrastructure in the Nelson Mandela Bay, from the 48,000-seater multipurpose stadium to the Integrated Public Transport System, which is operated by world-class busses. On the Eastern Region of the Province, Mthatha received a much needed boost in preparations to be a base camp and as such developed and built training facilities which include a world class pitch and a stadium that could be used for national events in the region. The World Cup indeed had a significant contribution to the province's economy, though not to the expected extent.



▲ Nelson Mandela Bay Stadium is a 48000-seater stadium in Port Elizabeth

How does the province ensure and build unity and cohesion, in the context of Polokwane Conference call for organizational renewal - what are challenges, approach and progress?

Challenges of unity and cohesion of the organisation in the province are characteristic of national challenges on these matters. Before the Polokwane Conference, at all levels of the organisation, structures had disagreements on issues mainly related to deployment and leadership preferences. These constituted a basis for factional activities and other foreign tendencies such as usage of patronage to buy loyalty of members. Whilst the province constituted the largest delegation to the National Conference in Polokwane, its delegation did not speak with one voice on issues related to leadership.

In the aftermath of Polokwane, the province was affected by activities of the splinter group (COPE), which identified the province as a major base for its activities. This had serious impact on the provincial leadership, as some PEC members, including the then Provincial Secretary resigned to join the splinter group. The activities of the splinter group provided the impetus for structures and all cadres of the movement in the province to unite in defense of the organisation. A major drive was thus initiated to mobilise structures of the organisation to unite and defeat the reactionary elements. This contributed immensely to uniting the organisation, particularly towards the 2009 National General Elections. Because of this unity, the ANC in the province won the elections overwhelmingly, albeit with a reduced majority in certain regions such as the Nelson Mandela Metro and Cacadu.

The 6th Provincial Conference that elected the incumbent PEC was also characterised by high levels of disunity and extreme polarisation based on leadership preferences. Since assuming office we (the Provincial Executive Committee) have prioritised the building of unity and cohesion in the province, we have engaged in a major political drive to address all challenges of the organisation that cause disunity including developing a structured programme of rigorous political education. Some of the challenges include amongst others, dealing with all concerns relating to re-alignment of regions, strategic deployment to the state, provincial government and municipal institutions, proper functioning of organisational structures and cementing Alliance relations.

The recent National General Council reiterated the call for organisational renewal and agreed on a number of focus areas for organisational renewal including a swift, firm, fair and impartial enforcement of organisational discipline. Using the NGC's call for organisational renewal the organisa-

tion in the province is surely making strides in building unity and cohesion. These efforts will bear fruit with improved performance of the organisation in the upcoming Local Government Elections.

What are the major challenges faced by the province in the lead-up to the 2011 Local Government Elections, has the state of local government improved since 1996?

The major challenge faced by the province is the high level of poverty and under-development. Most municipalities in the province depend on grants from the national government because they have a weak or non-existent revenue base. This causes a lot of service delivery backlogs in areas such as water and sanitation, road infrastructure, housing and job creation. The province thus continues to lag behind other provinces in eradicating these service delivery backlogs, most of which are inherited from the former Bantustan era.

Service delivery challenges have also been exacerbated by the recent economic recession. The recession resulted into a lot of job losses and the closure of companies and industries in areas such as Queenstown and Buffalo City. There is thus a phenomenon of continued de-industrialisation in the province, which worsens the poverty situation. A major support intervention is required at the national level to stem the tide of job losses. For the province to make a dent on the current service delivery backlogs, major funding injection from national government is required.

The majority of our municipalities have difficulties in attracting qualified and competent staff due to their remote location and inability to offer competitive employment packages. This seriously undermines the pace and quality of service delivery as well as the viability of these municipalities. Overall, the state of local government in the province has improved since 2006. Considerable progress has been made in areas such as delivery of houses, dealing with challenges of unity and cohesion at a local level and filling of Municipal Manager and Chief Financial Officer posts. A support package to enhance viability and capacity of many of our local government institutions is still required.

The situation of the provincial economy has resulted in the government being the major source of employment and economic empowerment. This has resulted in a high level of contestation for government deployment in order for one firstly to have a source of income, secondly the ability to influence the allocation of tenders and lastly the ability to influence the recruitment and employment within government in favour of friends and family. This tendency is prevalent across all levels of govern-

ment but has become extreme in the local government sphere due to weak systems and oversight. This has resulted in a high level of contestation for government deployment within the organization, leading to a severe breakdown of unity and cohesion within our branches and structures. This lack of unity and cohesion will have an adverse impact on our ability to mount a formidable campaign for the upcoming elections but we will put up measures to ensure that this contestation and its impact is managed.

What is the state of the opposition in the province?

The Province of the Eastern Cape being a traditional strong base of the ANC, enjoys overwhelming support from the people of the province. In 1994 the leading opposition in the province was the PAC but immediately after that its support started dwindling and in 1996/7 we saw the emergence of UDM. For a period from about 1997 to the early 2000's, there was a significant presence of UDM in the former Transkei largely concentrated in Mthatha and Mqanduli areas such that at one point in time the UDM was in majority in the King Sabatha Dalindyebo(KSD) Municipality Council. We have been able to win back our majority in the Mthatha and surrounding areas and the KSD Municipality Council. The support of UDM has dwindled considerably not to pose any serious threat to the ANC but there are still remnants of UDM supporter in the Mqanduli area.

In 2008 we saw the emergence of COPE. Like a veld fire it appeared to pose a threat to the ANC as we saw a mass exodus of former ANC leaders and members to this splinter group. During the 2009 national general elections, our people members came to the defense of the ANC and ensured that we retain our majority in the legislature even though reduced and Cope gained about 11% of the votes. This rise from zero to 11% was quite significant particularly noting that majority of these votes were from our former supporters. But, like a typical veld fire COPE began to dwindle due to internal squabbles and its inability to setup structures on the ground. The dwindling support for COPE can be witnessed by their poor performance in the local government by-elections where they have since lost every single local government by-elections to the ANC. Cope has also been experiencing a mass exodus of its membership and top leadership back to the ANC as they are realising that they are in a sinking boat. Thus, even though we are cautious, we believe at the present moment they pose no significant threat to the ANC.

A party that has registered growth in certain areas of the province is the DA. Its growth is concentrated in the western and urban parts of the province like the Nelson Mandela Metro, Cacadu and Buffalo City where there is a significant presence of minority groups.

The opposition generally does not pose a significant threat to the ANC, but understanding the nature of local government elections, our ability to chose the best possible candidates and our internal cohesion as an organisation will play a critical role in delivering us an overwhelming election victory.



Free to imagine

Reflections on Industrial Strategy

By PROF. TSHILIDZI MARWALA

INTRODUCTION

According to a report by McKinsey & Company, the African continent in 2008 had a total annual gross domestic product (GDP) of US\$1.6 trillion, and it is the third fastest growing region on the planet after China and India. The African economy is estimated to record 5% growth in 2010, which implies that it will add approximately US\$80 billion to the world economy. This is significant, given the current global economic climate, and this is approximately 25% of the South African economy. The African continent currently has over 1 billion people, and it is estimated that the continent will have 2 billion people in the next 40 years, with the youngest population on the planet. In just less than 20 years, Nigeria will overtake South Africa as the largest economy on the continent. In 40 years the African economy will be more integrated, the levels of democratization will be greatly expanded, and the number of educated people will be much higher than it is today. Indeed, the next 40 years will be an eventful period for the African continent. The average literacy rate in Africa today is at an all-time high and the conti-

nent is more democratic than ever before. These are exciting developments and demand of us as South Africa to position ourselves so that we can exploit the positive impact of all these developments.

AFRICA IN 40 YEARS

Given these dynamics, it is opportune for us to begin to plan for Africa in 40 years. In 40 years, the large population of the African continent will, necessarily, result in a decrease in the cost of labour. Considering the fact that manufacturing tends to follow large populations with low cost of labour, Africa will become an emerging factory floor for the world economy. In addition, given the unprecedented growth in literacy rates in the continent, it is estimated that 80% of Africans will be literate in 40 years. There will be much more secured nations and coast lines, as well as high levels of communication connectivity. However, this positive outlook is dimmed by the fact that the current environmentally-safe continent, with its impressive wildlife and biodiversity, will be severely challenged. Will the increased population size sink the

African continent into further poverty crisis? Will we have enough energy to give this population a good quality of life? Will the increased population density result in more pandemics and epidemics?

In order for us as South Africa to exploit the emerging opportunities while mitigating for the drastic consequences of these opportunities, we will need to ensure that we have an increased number of people who are trained in Science, Engineering, and Technology (SET). We need to position education at the centre of our political, economic and social strategies and tactics and, thereby, bridge the serious gaps that exist in these sectors. Currently, the Department of Higher Education and Training (DOHET) of South Africa plans to double the graduate output in SET to 23,000 per year by 2014. These are impressive numbers, given the fact that the World Economic Forum (WEF) in 2010 ranked higher education in South Africa 75 out of 139 countries. However, the critical problem that has to be dealt with is whether we have an optimal system in place at primary and secondary levels, as well as adequate infrastructure at the tertiary level to achieve these numbers. And if the conditions are not ideal, how do we mobilize all the motive forces to achieve this goal? The other goal of DOHET is to increase the number of graduates per year with master's degrees to 4,500, and with doctoral degrees to 1,350. These numbers should target specific disciplines that have strong correlations to industrialization and technological innovation. To achieve these postgraduate targets, we need to expand our educational infrastructures in terms of both quality and quantity. In particular, we need to increase the average number of academic staff with doctoral qualifications to 60% to increase postgraduate supervision as well as teaching and learning capacities. Furthermore, we need to increase the number of post-doctoral fellows to more than 1,000 to complement post-graduate supervision by 2014.

To bridge the gaps that exist in the political space, we need to invest in science, engineering and technology and move from a less than 1% of the GDP that South Africa invests into research and development (R&D) to 2% by 2014. We need to greatly support and comprehend the relationships between critical international agreements such as the recent Copenhagen agreement on climate change and economic growth. We need to develop capacity to produce and exploit intellectual property and develop mechanisms to better trade scientific and technological goods.

To bridge the gaps that exist in the social sphere, we need to increase scientific and technology literacy within the general populace. This would entail using community infrastructure to increase the capacity to produce students with mathematics and science competency and mobilize communities

to adopt technological tools to improve the quality of life. In 2010, the WEF ranked South Africa 137 out of 139 countries in the quality of mathematics and science education and ranked South Africa 130 in the quality of education in general. Even though this statistic may be debatable, it does indicate that we need to relook at our education strategy with regard to mathematics and science education. Government needs to urgently quarantine this problem and engage society and the South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU) on the issue of the possibility of increasing teaching hours during the week and introducing government and/or community-funded teaching on Saturdays.

To bridge the gaps that exist within the economic space, we have to employ science and technology to increase economic participation, invest in strategic technologies that would increase South Africa's competitiveness and deploy science, engineering, and technology to solve problems such as food shortages. As we move ahead towards 2050, there are critical areas that South Africa needs to intensify its investment. These areas include space sciences, energy, biotechnology, information and communications technology, as well as climate change. In space sciences, areas such as remote sensing need to be further developed and indigenized to increase visibility of areas of geographic importance and thus improve land usage and agricultural output. Remote sensing is also essential for monitoring the coast lines and, thereby, strengthening vital economic activities such as enforcing fishing rights. On ensuring that South Africa has sufficient energy to meet its growing population, we need to adopt an optimal diversity of energy sources that strike a balance between nuclear, hydro, biomass, wind, and solar energies keeping in mind the efficiency, cost, and the environmental consequences of these energy sources. A special emphasis on renewable energy needs to be placed, and the South African energy pool needs to be integrated while focusing on efficient utilization of this energy.

Another area that needs to be developed is biotechnology. In this regard, South Africa needs to ensure that an indigenous pharmaceutical industry is established, with a focus on generic medication. To expand the agricultural production and ensure food security, genetically modified food needs to be pursued while ensuring its safety for human consumption. This should naturally include bio-fuels, such as ethanol, so that we can increase the capacity of South Africa to meet its global commitments on climate change. We need to use biotechnology to increase our capacity to perform world-class agro-processing to intensify food security and ultimately strengthen our export sector.

Information technology for societal development is an area that requires special attention. This would include expanding connectivity in terms of internet, telecommunication, and transportation. The computational power needed to achieve all these is now becoming readily available, especially given the new advances in cloud computing where there is no need for one to have sophisticated computers to perform complex tasks. Such tasks can be achieved through the general roll-out of internet services to the masses. Of course this would require the availability and the reduction of the cost of broadband. With these advances in both telecommunication infrastructure and the reduction of costs, this would open up opportunities in outsourcing, especially for call centres. The WEF ranked South Africa 76 out of 139 countries in 2010 in terms of technological readiness. We need to increase technological readiness by expanding broadband access and increasing the usage of the internet, especially given the current migration of the internet from the desktop computer to the cell phone.

The most significant event that will define Africa in the next 40 years is the area of industrialization and the expansion of the manufacturing base. In the 18th century, greater Asia (India, China, and Japan) contributed 60% to the global manufacturing output while the West (Europe and North America) contributed only 20%. By 2000, the West contributed approximately 50% to the global manufacturing output while greater Asia contributed 30%. The current trend is that the manufacturing output of the West is shrinking while that of greater Asia is expanding. Asia is growing because of its competitiveness in the cost of labour, not because it alone is the technical centre of excellence. Yes, Asia has invested heavily in human resources and infrastructure but the main driver for the rise of greater Asia is a combination of good education, large population, and cheap labour. With this shift of the planet's manufacturing centre to Asia, the competitiveness of the Asian economy in terms of the cost of labour is slowly but surely declining. This will result in the shifting of the planet's manufacturing centre-of-mass towards the African continent.

THE PATH TO INDUSTRIALIZATION

In preparation for this shift in the manufacturing centre-of-mass, the South African government has adopted an industrial policy whose objectives include shifting the South African industrialization process to a knowledge economy. A knowledge economy is an economy where knowledge is used to produce economic value and usually refers to knowledge engineering and management. The key drivers for a knowledge economy include, but are

not limited to, knowledge policy, innovation and intellectual policy, good educational foundation at primary, secondary and tertiary levels with strong emphasis on science, engineering and technology. Moving towards the knowledge economy will require intensified mobilization of resources and increased investment into education, particularly technical education. South Africa currently produces 1,200 PhD graduates and this falls far short of the estimated minimum of 5,000 that is required to jump-start a viable knowledge economy, particularly when one factors in the numbers that emigrate.

On the issue of knowledge generation, Africa as a whole contributes less than 1% of global scientific output. In order for the continent to have a viable knowledge economy, we need to increase this to 10%. In the South African higher education sector there is a tendency to pursue sheer publications numbers irrespective of the specific disciplines of the research output. This is mainly due to the fact that funding formula for accredited research output does not discriminate fields. Consequently, a paper published on the history of the early inhabitants of Duthuni Village in the Limpopo Province receives the same amount of subsidy as the paper on the introduction of a new composite material that is used to manufacture aeroplane wings. The subsidy for accredited output should be weighted in accordance with the expected economic value of the particular field of study. We need to increase research outputs in strategic areas such as nuclear sciences and aerospace engineering.

To increase the industrial base of the country we need to ensure that labour-absorbing industries are developed into vital aspects of the industrialization value chain. This would involve mobilizing the youth that is completely disengaged from either the workforce or any form of learning, which currently stands at 2.8 million out of 3.7 million in the 18 to 24 age bracket. This mobilization of the youth will involve vastly expanding the FET colleges, requiring a strong linkage between government, existing higher education institutions, and industry. It is estimated that this process of establishing a critical number of FET colleges will take at least five years. Thus, the institutional mechanisms for the establishment of these colleges that should form the bedrock of the skills revolution, will require razor-sharp and laser-guided planning and execution initiatives that comprehend key inter-relationships amongst vital variables. The emphasis for the 2.8 million youth should be to create artisan skills, comprehension abilities, and communication competence so that this youth can increase South Africa's capacity to industrialize. The artisan training should also focus on

creating a workforce that will play a critical role in automotives and automobile manufacturing as well as maintenance of key infrastructure. Furthermore, we need to strengthen the technical skills-base that will increase our capability for metal fabrication as well as transport and logistics capacity that would facilitate the implementation of large public projects.

IN CONCLUSION

We need to find a balance between primary industries e.g. basic manufacturing, secondary industries e.g. intermediary manufacturing, and tertiary industries e.g. knowledge economy. This should be treated as a portfolio where the optimal combination of these should balance the relationship between risk and return on investment. The portfolio approach should be extended to the way we reward research activities in higher education by introducing the concept of the return on investment onto the publication subsidy formula. We need to identify and nurture the type of leadership style and personalities that will increase our capacity to industrialize. We need to identify science, engineering and technology areas that are critical for our development yet are balanced in terms of risk and reward. We ought to identify the relationships between the African economic integration and South Africa's industrialization project.

Pertinent questions seeking answers should include factors such as: Does the African economic integration enhance the pace of industrialization in South Africa? We need to identify and implement the growth path that avoids structural imbalances by ensuring that the extension of credit is carefully monitored, unemployment brought under control and increase in competitiveness in the manufacturing sector. We need to synchronize micro- and the macro-economic policies. We also need to encourage public and private procurement to promote domestic production. Finally we ought to develop skills and innovation policies that are in tandem with priorities that balance risks and rewards.

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
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Debating the Nationalization of Mines

National Union of Mineworkers



OThe ANCYL released a discussion document on Nationalization of the Mines (Umrabulo no. 33). The document in the first sections deals with research, political and ideological conceptions - with this portion of the document the Union is of the view that there is no need to engage with facts and ideological perspectives that are known and acceptable. What should be engaged with are the sections "Why Mines should be nationalized" and "What is to be done".

In the debate, the ANCYL managed to bring back to the discussions and focus of the movement the question of nationalization and the need to have the Freedom Charter as central to the economic policies of the ANC and government. The document however has the following weaknesses:

- Blackmailing those who differ with the approach or the debate;
- Ignoring both legislative and policy frame-

works dealing with this debate; and

- Tactically linking the debate to have mines nationalized and nominations or support for elections in the 2012 ANC Centenary Conference.

The ANC released its Economic discussion paper for the National General Council,

September 2010. In the section, "Some Debates- the balance of power and ownership", the questions raised by the discussion document are relevant but with the following weaknesses: (a) The ANC can't be silent on whether mines should be nationalized or not, its position should not be represented by questions but it should be clear on its preference; and (b) whilst correct to look at failed nationalized mines, the ANC should also have an interest where nationalized mines were not a failure.

The National Union of Mineworkers Central Committee held on 13-14 May 2010 resolved that NUM must develop its own position, consult relevant stakeholders and publish its own position. This NUM position should be based on the following:

- Nationalization in a mixed economy;
- Nationalization as not inherently progressive, but also private ownership as not inherently efficient; and

Different approaches to nationalization and the proposed approach preferred by NUM.

THE ANCYL CALL AND THE FREEDOM CHARTER (1955)

In its discussion paper, the ANCYL uses the Freedom Charter as the base for the nationalization of mines, in particular the clause that states:

"The national wealth of our country, the heritage of all South Africans, shall be restored to the people;

The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole; all other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the well-being of the people; all people shall have equal rights to trade where they choose, to manufacture and to enter all trades crafts and Professions".

This quote from the Freedom Charter is correct, but it should not be used in isolation from the Minerals Petroleum Resources and Development Act (MPRDA). This Act is very clear and progressive on the implementation of this clause of the Freedom Charter in the mining sector. For example, the Act stipulates, under the heading -"Custodianship of nation's mineral and petroleum resources" the following:

- 1) "Mineral and petroleum resources are the common heritage of all the people of South Africa and the State is the custodian thereof for the benefit of all South Africans,
- 2) As the custodian of the nation's mineral and petroleum resources- the state, may:
 - Grant, issue, refuse, control, administer and manager any reconnaissance permission, prospecting right, permission to remove, mining right, mining permit, retention permit, technical co-operation permit, reconnaissance permit, exploration right and production right; and
 - In consultation with the Minister of Finance, determine and levy, any fee or consideration payable in terms of any relevant Act of Parliament.
- 3) The Minister must ensure the sustainable development of South Africa's mineral and

petroleum resources within a framework of National Environmental Policy, norms and standards while promoting economic and social development."

The NUM Central Committee resolved that the intension of the legislation (MPRDA) quoted above section is indeed in conformity with the Freedom Charter call for the mines to be nationalized. It should be remembered that the Freedom Charter clause is calling for "the mineral wealth beneath the soil" to be nationalized. The Act should therefore be taken as a guide in debating the issue of nationalizing mines.

THE SACP'S ROAD TO SOUTH AFRICAN FREEDOM (1962)

The Road to South African Freedom, under the section 'Economic Development' states "the Party will press for the strengthening of the state sector of the economy, particularly in the fields of heavy industry, machine tool, building and fuel production. It will seek to place control of the vital sectors of the economy in the hands of the national democratic state to correct historic injustices, by demanding the nationalization of mining industry, banking and monopoly industrial establishments, thus also laying the foundation for the advance to socialism. At the same time, the state should protect the interests of private business where these are not incompatible with the public interest. It should offer assistance, by way of state loans, to non-monopolist producers, in return for state share in their undertaking, thus paving the way for gradual and peaceful transition to socialism".

ANCYL ON "WHY MINES SHOULD BE NATIONALIZED"

The ANCYL in the section of its document dealing with "Why Mines should be nationalized" puts forward the following as motivation:

- Nationalization to increase state fiscal capacity and better the working conditions
- Nationalization as the basis for industrialization
- Nationalization as a means to safeguard sovereignty
- Nationalization as a basis to transform the accumulation path in the South African economy
- Nationalization to transform South Africa's uneven spatial development patterns.

The NUM appreciates the ideological basis of the above motivations by the ANCYL, but believes they will weaken the ANCYL position if they are debated in detail. This is because the majority of these motivations are in actual fact

contained in the MPRDA and the Mining charter and they remain relevant whether the mines are nationalized or not.

The NUM Central Committee resolved that, all the past NUM resolutions were based on the ideological understanding of the above position. The NUM's position on the

nationalization of mines should have ideological clarity and that the issue of the class interest to be addressed by nationalization should not be the last word on the debate.

Below, are the sections in the Minerals, Petroleum and Resources Development Act, 2002 that deal with the above motivations:

Definition

Transforming such industries so as to assist in, provide for, initiate or facilitate –

1) The ownership, participation in or the benefiting from existing or future mining, prospecting, exploration or production operations;

2) The participation in or control of management of such operations;

3) The development of management, scientific, engineering or other skills of historically disadvantaged persons;

4) The involvement of or participation in the procurement chains of operations;

5) The ownership of and participating in the beneficiation of the proceeds of the operations or other upstream or downstream value chains in such industries;

6) The socio-economic development of communities immediately hosting, affected by the supplying of labour to the operations; and

Objects of the Act:

1) Recognize the internationally accepted right of the State to exercise sovereignty overall the mineral and petroleum resources within the Republic;

2) Give effect to the principle of the State's custodianship of the nation's mineral and petroleum resources;

3) Promote equitable access to the nation's mineral and petroleum resources to all the people of South Africa;

4) Substantially and meaningfully expand opportunities for historically disadvantaged persons, including women, to enter the mineral and petroleum industries and to benefit from the exploitation of the nation's mineral and petroleum resources;

5) Promote economic growth and mineral and petroleum resources development in the Republic;

6) Promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of all South Africans

7) Provide for security of tenure in respect of

prospecting, exploration, mining and production operations:

8) Give effect to section 24 of the Constitution by ensuring that the nation's mineral and petroleum resources are developed in an orderly and ecologically sustainable manner while promoting justifiable social and economic development; and

9) Ensure that holders of mining and production rights contribute towards the socio-economic development of the areas in which they are operating."

COMPARATIVE CHECK ON ANCYL AND NUM POSITIONS

(a) On the state mining company

The ANCYL argues "the South African government should officially establish a State Owned Mining Company, which will under its control bring the currently state owned Alexkor, State Diamond Trader and all state shares in mining activities, SASOL and Provincial Agencies. The State Mining Company will amongst others be responsible for the ownership and control of the mineral resources; the maximisation of the nation's economic gain from the mineral resources, socio-economic development, maintenance of strong safety and environmental standards as well as the deliberate development of mineral resources."

The NUM 13th National Congress Resolution, held in May 2009 acknowledged the adoption and implementation of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA), reverting mineral rights to the state as the custodian of our mineral wealth and land. In this regard Congress mandated the NEC to engage government on the strategy and legislation for the state owned company in mining. The NUM further resolved to call for improved beneficiation of minerals and measures to regulate and stimulate the fabrication of raw materials into finished and semi-finished products.

NUM's position is therefore that (i) there must be an urgent and dedicated audit on the ownership and conditions of service in the mining industry; (ii) the state must audit and quantify its investment within the mining industry; (iii) no sale of any government stake within the mining industry pending the final decision on which option will our country adopt; and (iv) the ministry of mineral resources develops draft legislation towards establishment of the state mining company. Furthermore, the Constitution says "no provision of this section (Property Clause) may impede the state from taking legislative and

other measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination, provided that any departure from the provisions of this section is in accordance with the provisions of section 36(1)".

The Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act compels applicants for mining rights to have not less than 30% equity ownership and control by historically disadvantaged individuals. Whilst not eroding the initial intention, the MPRDA should be amended to say the applicants and corporations applying for mining in South Africa should be in partnership with the state-owned mining company, wherein the state owns not less than 60% of the shares and right of determination.

The amended Act should apply to new mining licenses and all those who seek to renew their licenses. In order to have a clearer regulatory framework on this principle, the South African government should place a moratorium on the issuing of licenses until the Act has been amended.

Thus, both the NUM and ANCYL positions on the state mining company reflect commonalities, with only the difference on the renewal of mining licenses and the envisaged percentage share on ownership.

b) The Expropriation model

Section 25 of the Republic of South Africa Constitution (referred to as the Property Clause) protects private property, but also calls on the State to "take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions, which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis". This is within the basis of a subsection that says "property may be expropriated only in terms of law."

South Africa needs an Expropriation Law that will address expropriation irrespective of the economic sector. It is unfortunate that we currently do not have such due to parliament toeing the big business line. Both the ANCYL and NUM must engage the ANC on the need to have the Expropriation Bill through Parliament. This process will then address all the challenges on expropriation irrespective of the sector.

Amendments to the MPRDA are also long overdue, and even government is considering making some proposed amendments, so we should prepare ourselves and work on the areas where we would prefer amendments. The Department of Minerals Resources has already started with proposed amendments and NUM will develop its own submissions when this process is open for public comments on the follow-

ing areas:

- Inclusion of a section dealing with a state mining company or new separate legislation in this regard; and
- Role clarification and reduced bureaucratic process between the departments of Minerals Resources, Water Affairs and Environment on different plans submitted with the application for mining rights.

The process to amend the Act should be an open and democratic process involving all stakeholders and should happen immediately after the ANC has officially resolved on the perspective in its 53rd National Conference in 2012. The ANC National General Council in September 2010 should give concrete guidelines on how certain processes should unfold.

The amended MPRDA should not undermine legislations regulating the Minerals and Petroleum Industry in South Africa, but should decidedly be directed towards total alteration of property relations in South Africa. The other legislations that should be upheld include the Section 24 of the Constitution, which calls for the nation's mineral and petroleum resources to be developed in an orderly and ecologically sustainable manner while promoting justifiable social and economic development.

The principle that the "mineral and petroleum resources are the common heritage of all the people of South Africa and [that] the state is the custodian thereof for the benefit of all South Africans" should underpin all legislations about the country's mineral resources.

Other sections to be amended:

- Section 23 (1) (c): dealing with financing plan and confirmed or available funding to avoid the repetition of the Aurora situation.
- Section 23 (1) (e): on Social Labour Plans, it should be mandatory that the majority union signs with the employer before submission to DMR and that non-signing of the majority union should result on the Plan not being approved.
- Section 26: on Mineral Beneficiation to be re-worked as whole in accordance with the beneficiation strategy as suggested.

The ANC National General Council (NGC), September 2010 should discuss nationalization as an economic option for both the ANC and government economic development policies. When resolved and accepted the issue of the sector should be based on the socio-economic context and linked to IPAP2, the New Growth Path, the basis to build capacity for the developmen-

tal state and for the role of the state in the productive economy.
The NGC should resolve that the government be instructed to decommodify basic services like education, health, water, electricity, sanitation and public transport (such as the subsidy programme for taxi's).

NATIONALIZATION OF MINES: NUM'S VIEW

The ANC NGC discussion paper for the NGC raises the following: "We need to ensure that proposals become more specific about (a) who would end up owning the assets; (b) who would manage them, and with what purpose; (c) what would be the costs to the fiscus and the economy; and (d) what would be the risks of failure as well as the benefits of success".
NUM's view is that there are different models of nationalization and that the choice is always informed by the needs of the affected governments, looking at some of the known models below, it can be divided into full-scale nationalization or strategic funds/equity by government:


Recent examples of nationalization	Examples of strategic funds/strategic equity
Venezuela: oil Bolivia: Natural Gas SA: mineral rights to the state	Botswana and De Beers Chile Norway

NUM does not support a blanket/wholesale nationalization but prefers the model on "strategic fund/strategic equity". The proposed state mining company should be the government vehicle in the mining industry, but it should focus and invest only on the following strategic minerals:
■ Energy minerals: platinum, coal and uranium
■ Infrastructure Minerals: ion ore and manganese

Below is an illustration of this approach:

An illustration on one mineral per category	
Platinum: South Africa is said to have 88% of the world reserve on Platinum group metals (PGM), with the development and implementation of beneficiation strategy and mining strategy. South Africa could move away from being an assembly point for some component parts of motorcars and be both assembly and manufacturer of those component parts and also jet engines.	Ion ore: With the development and implementation of Beneficiation strategy and Mining strategy, we should nationalise both Ion Ore mines and Accerlo Mittal Steel and the results would be that the price of steel locally could be mitigated and cushioned. Just taking the contribution of steel in the building industry, the role of both iron ore and steel will not be under estimated.

Figure : Illustration on distribution of dividends



Mining Charter on the section, "Ownership of Business Entity" has the following areas: "a majority shareholding position, i.e. 50% + 1 share; joint ventures or partnerships (25% equity plus one share); and broad-based ownership (such as HDSA, dedicated mining unit trusts or employee share ownership schemes)".
It is further our believe that the proceeds from the State Mining Company (including royalties and taxes) be ring-fenced for education, health, rural development and re-investment in the State Mining Company - legislation in this regard must be therefore be developed.

THE MINING INDUSTRY AS A WHOLE - NUM'S VIEW

On the transformation of the mining industry as a whole, the NUM suggests the following process:
• The NGC mandates Cabinet to finalize the Mineral Beneficiation Strategy and that this strategy be included in the IPAP2.
• As per the agreement between organized business, labour and government on the Mining Summit 2010 and current public hearings in Parliament - the NGC should call on government to work towards establishment of the State Mining Company (consolidate all current government investments across all spheres)
■ The Minister of Labour to legislate minimum wages for the mining industry (including mining contractors and small scale mining).
■ Parliament should develop a comprehensive mining strategy (15-20 years: reviewed after every 5years) for South Africa. The Planning Commission, DMR, organized labour and organized business should play an active role.
■ Parliament (through COGTA and DMR) should develop a common approach on community or traditional authority ownership in the mining industry, which will include accountability, the role of the community and the role of the state.
■ That government should increase its capacity for investment and responsibility for exploration; both the budget and capacity of the Council on Geosciences should be improved.
■ Invest in capacity and technology to detect seismic possibilities with exact workplace and exact time and date - this will allow evacuation to be informed and pro-active.
■ Consideration should be given to minerals that do not fall within the energy and infrastructure category to be addressed through a windfall tax (to include Sasol), Mineral Beneficiation Strategy and then include both mandatory ESOPS (10% of annual turnover) and Community Investment (10% of annual turnover).

CONCLUSION

The debate on nationalization remains critical but the approach should be more on need for responsive economic policies on the current challenges facing the working class and the poor. It should also focus on the transformation of the historic apartheid and colonial approach to min-

ing and mineral resources transformed in line with the MPRDA and the Mining Charter. The contribution of the mining industry to labour sending areas and mining towns/communities as stipulated in the mining charter remains one of the areas for the state (DMR) to focus during this phase of the Mining Charter. NUM as the majority trade union in the mining sector must ensure that this debate is also completed through a focus on improving working conditions and conditions of service of mineworkers through the promulgation of minimum wages and the establishment of the compulsory bargaining council for the sector.
The progressive force on the left should engage on this discussion on the basis of nationalization as the building block for socialism and that state capitalism should not be confused with nationalization. This debate must at its centre place the class character and class content of nationalization.

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
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Measuring gender equality



By FEBE POTGIETER-GQUBULE

The World Economic Forum (WEF) published its fifth *Global Gender Gap Report* in 2010, and Lesotho for the first time since the existence of the index made it into the top ten in the world in terms of gender parity. Four Southern African countries made it into the top 30 ranked countries: Lesotho (ranked 8th), South Africa (12th), Mozambique (22nd), Namibia (25th) and with Botswana the next ranked country from the region at 62nd place.

The Global Gender Gap Index is an annual index published by the World Economic Forum, which measures the gender gap in countries based on four dimensions: economic participation and opportunities, health and survival, educational attainment and political empowerment (see Table 1).

Economic Participation and Opportunity	Educational attainment
- Labour force participation - Wage equality for similar work (survey) - Estimated earned income (PPP US\$) - Legislators, senior officials, and managers - Professional and technical workers	6. Literacy rate 7. Enrolment in primary education 8. Enrolment in secondary education 9. Enrolment in tertiary education
Political empowerment	Health and Survival
- Women in parliament - Women in ministerial positions - Years with female head of state (last 50)	- Sex ratio at birth (female/male) - Healthy life expectancy

Source: World Economic Forum (2010). *Global Gender Gap Report 2010*

Motivating for such an index, the Preface to the 2006 report argued that the gap between men and women "not only undermines the quality of life of one half of the world's population, but also poses a significant risk to the long-term growth and well-being of nations: countries that do not capitalize on the full potential of one half of their human resources may compromise their competitive potential." The World Economic Forum thus in its 2002 *Global Competitiveness Report* included qualitative aspects of women's participation in the workforce, and in later reports included aspects of gender of equality in its competitive measures.

The *Global Gender Gap Index* is presented as "a framework for capturing the magnitude and scope of gender-based disparities and tracking their progress." The index methodology is therefore based on three principles. Firstly, it measures gender-based gaps in access to resources and opportunities in individual countries rather than the actual levels of the available resources and opportunities in those countries. It is therefore said to be independent from countries' levels of development. Secondly, the index measures outcomes, rather than inputs. So for example, the index regards the gap between the number of men and women in high-skilled jobs as an outcome variable, whereas the length of maternity leave is regarded as an input variable. Finally, the focus is on gender equality, rather than on women's empowerment. The index therefore rewards countries where there is no gap between men and women, but neither penalizes nor award variables where women outperform men.

THE 2010 GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX - SOME PROGRESS, BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN

The 2010 Global Gender Gap Index covers 134 countries, which together represent over 90% of the world's population. The 2010 report further divides the 134 countries into different income groups. Accordingly in 2010, the Nordic countries led the way in the high-income group; South Africa and Cuba ranked the highest in the upper-middle-income group; Lesotho and Philippines came out top in the lower-middle-income group; and Mozambique and Uganda were the strongest performers in the lower-income group (see Table 2).

Table 2. The Global Gender Gap Index 2010 rankings top 30: comparisons with 2009, 2008, 2007 and 2006.

Country	2010 rank	2009 rank	2008 rank	2007 rank	2006 rank
Iceland	1	1	4	4	4
Norway	2	3	1	2	2
Finland	3	2	2	3	3
Sweden	4	4	3	1	1
New Zealand	5	5	5	5	7
Ireland	6	8	8	9	10
Denmark	7	7	7	8	8
Lesotho*	8	10	16	26	43
Philippines	9	9	6	6	6
Switzerland	10	13	14	40	26
Spain	11	17	17	10	11
South Africa*	12	6	22	20	18
Germany	13	12	11	7	5
Belgium	14	33	28	19	20
United Kingdom	15	15	13	11	9
Sri Lanka	16	16	12	15	13
Netherlands	17	11	9	12	12
Latvia	18	14	10	13	19
United States	19	31	27	31	23
Canada	20	25	31	18	14
Trinidad and Tobago	21	19	19	46	45
Mozambique*	22	26	18	43	n/a
Australia	23	20	21	17	15
Cuba	24	29	25	22	n/a
Namibia*	25	32	30	29	38
Luxembourg	26	63	66	58	56
Mongolia	27	22	40	62	42
Costa Rica	28	27	32	28	30
Argentina	29	24	24	33	41
Nicaragua	30	49	71	90	62
Botswana*	62	39	63	53	34

* The top five ranked Southern African countries

Source: World Economic Forum (2010). *Global Gender Gap Report 2010*, page 8.

- The 2010 ranking by sub-index shows the following overall trends:
- 96% of the gap on health outcomes between women and men has been closed.
 - Almost 93% of the gap on educational attainment has been closed.
 - However, the gap between women and men on economic participation and political empowerment remains wide: only 59% of the economic outcomes gap and only 18% of the political outcomes gap has been closed.

Table 3. The Global Gender Gap Index 2010 rankings by sub-index			
Economic participation and opportunity		Educational attainment	
Country	Rank	Country	Rank
Lesotho*	1	A total of 37 countries achieved a perfect equality score of 1, including Botswana and Lesotho.	
Mongolia	2		
Norway	3		
Bahamas	4		
Mozambique*	5		
Barbados	7	Namibia*	34
Canada	8	South Africa*	43
New Zealand	9	Mozambique*	123
Moldova	10		
Namibia*	27		
Botswana*	29		
South Africa*	55		
Health and survival		Political empowerment	
There are 37 countries that scored a perfect equal score of 1 on the gender gap, and are therefore all ranked no. 1, including Lesotho*.		Iceland	1
		Finland	2
		Norway	3
		Sweden	4
		Spain	5
South Africa*	101	Sri Lanka	6
Namibia*	104	Ireland	7
Mozambique*	110	New Zealand	8
Botswana*	125	South Africa*	9
		Denmark	10
		Mozambique*	11
		Lesotho*	34
		Namibia*	38
		Botswana*	108
* The five highest ranked Southern African countries in 2010: Lesotho, South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia and Botswana.			

Gender parity and economic participation and opportunity: Of the five ranked Southern African countries (Table 3 above), Lesotho is ranked number 1 in the world in terms of economic participation and opportunity. On the four measures falling within this sub-index, this small country in 2010 achieved ‘wage equality for similar work’ between men and women, the labour force participation rate for women is 72% and for men 79% and women outnumber men in high-skilled senior positions in both the ‘legislators, managers and senior officials’ category as well as in the ‘professional and technical workers’ category. Mozambique, ranked fifth in the economic participation and opportunity sub-index, also did well in terms of equal pay for equal work and labour force participation.

South Africa amongst the five Southern African countries did the worst on this sub-index, doing badly on the gender gap with regards labour force participation of women, equal pay for equal

work and the number of women in the ‘legislators, managers and senior officials’. It is only in the ‘professional and technical category’ that South African women outnumber their menfolk.

Education and health rankings: Botswana and Lesotho shared the number 1 spot in terms of gender equality in educational attainment with twenty other countries (Table 3 above). Botswana achieved gender equality in 2010 with regards literacy rates, and Botswana women have overtaken their menfolk in terms of enrollment in primary, secondary and tertiary education. Lesotho women have overtaken men in all four measures on the educational attainment ranking. Mozambique fared the worst of the five countries in terms of educational attainment.

Lesotho also occupies the number one spot for its health rankings, along with thirty-six other countries, based on sex ratio at birth and healthy life expectancy. None of the other four SADC countries made it into the top 100 in terms of health and survival.

Political empowerment – it helps to have a female head of state: South Africa, ranked 9th, made it into the top 10 in terms of political empowerment. On the measure ‘women in parliament’ within this sub-index it is ranked second in the world and ranked fourteenth on the measure ‘number of women ministers’. However, the fact that it has not had a female head of state in the last fifty years, impacted on its overall ranking! South Africa is closely followed by Mozambique, ranked ninth on the measure ‘women in parliament’ and thirty-fourth for its number of women ministers. Its overall ranking on political empowerment was however pushed up due to the fact that it had a female head of state for six out of the last fifty years (under colonial rule). Botswana ranked a lowly 108 performed poorly on the number of women parliamentarians and ministers, and also for not having a female head of states in the last fifty years.

MEASURING THE CORPORATE GENDER GAP

Complementing the *Global Gender Gap Report*, the World Economic Forum for the first time in 2010 also published *The Corporate Gender Gap Report*. This report, according to the WEF aims “to take a deeper look at the economic participation and opportunity gap as well as at what companies are doing—and should do—to close this gap.”

Although still country based, it draws its information from a survey of companies in each of the participating countries, and thus focusing on the private sector only. The survey questions cover the following areas:

- **Representation of women in business:** including the breakdown of men and women in different job categories; the number of women on the company board, whether the CEO is a man or woman; and whether women hold senior positions in critical areas of the business.
- **Measurement and target setting:** questions here focus on whether employers track equal pay for equal work for their employees; the gender breakdown by salary level; and the existence or not of affirmative action policies to increase women in senior company positions.
- **Work-life balance practices:** survey questions include whether the company offers maternity leave and at what percentage pay; whether other form of parental leave is offered and how often this is taken by men; does the company allow long term career-break leave for parents, what percentage of such leave taken by men and whether those taking career break leave for parental reasons return to work at the same or a higher level; and whether the company has childcare facilities and the type.
- **Mentorship and training for leadership:** does the company offer access to networking and mentorship programmes and the percentage of women in such programmes; and whether the company offers and finances executive training and further education opportunities.
- **Barriers to leadership:** companies are required to rate on a scale from 1 (least problematic) to 5 (most problematic) the factors that are barriers to women’s rise to leadership positions in companies (see Table 4).
- **Effects of the economic downturn:** finally, companies had to answer survey questions on whether the downturn affected female employees more than male employees, in their company as well as in their industry.

This first *Corporate Gender Gap 2010* was conducted in thirty OECD member countries, and the survey conducted amongst the 100 largest employers in each of these countries. Some of the highlights from the findings of the survey include:

- The average number of women holding CEO positions in the countries and companies surveyed in 2010 was around 5%. Finland (13%), Norway (12%), Turkey (12%), Italy (11%) and Brazil (11%) had the highest percentage of female CEOs, while Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, India, Mexico, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States had no female CEOs among the responding companies.
- Female employees are concentrated in entry and mid-level positions, and few companies measure how many women occupy entry, middle and senior level positions in their companies.
- There is general low representation of women on company boards, with the exception of Norway that had 40% of women membership of boards in 2010. Norway introduced mandatory quotas for women.
- With regards to barriers to women rising to leadership positions in companies, respondents listed general norms and cultural practices in their countries, masculine/patriarchal corporate culture and the lack of role models as the most problematic barrier to women's rise to leadership (Figure 1 below).




Source: World Economic Forum (2010). *Corporate Gender Gap 2010*, page 10

CONCLUSION

The two reports show that although progress is being made in bridging the gender equality gap, much more needs to be done. Furthermore, the Global Gender Gap Report and the Corporate Gender Gap Report 2010 both show that in the area of economic participation and opportunity, we still have a long way to go. We should look forward the Corporate Gender Gap Report to cover as many countries as the first report, so that we tackle the lack of gender transformation in the private sector.

REFERENCES

The Global Gender Gap Report 2010 and the Corporate Gender Gap Report 2010 can be downloaded from <https://members.weforum.org/pdf/gendergap/report2010.pdf> and http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_CorporateReport_2010.pdf respectively.



Celebrating unbroken service to the people: revisiting the role of the ANC

By **THANDO NTLEMEZA**

Like all revolutions, the South African revolution requires a movement to provide leadership and take the revolution to its logical conclusion. It requires the "art of leadership [which] consists in providing leadership to the masses and not just its most advanced elements..." and that can assist revolutionaries to advance the struggle to change society for the better, because the task of revolutionaries is not simply to change laws or replace government officials.

In the current juncture, people are supposed to be seized with the task of defending, consolidating and advancing the revolution. To perform this task, they require a movement that is better experienced, equipped and positioned to the defend gains of the revolution and interests of the people. They require the most advanced elements of society that remain focused on defending and advancing the cause of the people, a cause which should not be confused with selfish interests of people who masquerade as defenders of the revolution.

Given the task of the moment, the issue of leadership has to be approached from the per-

spective of a revolutionary collective required to lead the struggle to change our society for the better. A collective which is determined to resolve contradictions that have been dominant in our society for many decades; that knows that leadership is not just a matter of individuals but of an organization and that understands that leaders must be able to "combine an impassioned spirit with a cold mind and make painful decisions without flinching."

When they mandate the ANC to lead their struggles to consolidate and advance the transformation of their society, the people of South Africa are inspired by the unprecedented leadership demonstrated by this movement during the darkest days of the liberation struggle. These are the people who will never be confused about the reason why they rally behind the ANC. For them, it has always been and continues to be because of the long history and successes of this democratic movement in leading struggles of the people for freedom, liberation and democracy. For this reason, these people remain convinced that ours is the only 'tried and tested'

movement, which is capable of leading their struggles.

South African people know and understand that the ANC does not only have unequalled credentials in leading people's struggles during the liberation struggle, but also in democratic governance. These victories must be jealously guarded because they were earned through the collective belief and efforts of the people of South Africa and the world. Needless to mention, leaders of the liberation struggle have to be commended for their consistent emphasis on the collective approach to the struggle.

In fact, the ANC has always strived to strike a balance between discharging of specific responsibilities by individual leaders and the principle of collective leadership to ensure and promote a common understanding and approach to the challenges facing the people. This means that the theory of our revolution recognizes the role of individuals and collectives in pursuit of the struggle to change South Africa for the better. But, individual leaders are - at all times - required to act within confines of a leadership collective and organizational discipline because the individual remains subordinate to the collective and the organization.

APPROACH TO LEADERSHIP

Using words of a revolutionary of contemporary times, Mao Tsetung, we can state that 'throughout its history, our party has stressed the combination of the role of the individual with collective leadership.' With this approach to leadership, ours is destined to continue enjoying the confidence of the people, who are proud of the movement because of the advances it has made and continues to make in liberating the people. Those who understand that revolutionary leaders make history as part of the people they lead, and not as detached elites, but knowing and understanding that leadership of our movement should be inspired by the hopes and aspirations of the people, especially the poor and marginalized.

Never at stage must we forget that it is the people who entrust the ANC - by extension its leadership - with a responsibility to lead their struggles for freedom, liberation and democracy because they regard the ANC as their only vehicle through which they can liberate themselves. This reminds us that the ANC is a people's movement that was formed - in 1912 - to serve the people. It is for this reason that the leadership and membership of the movement have a political responsibility to ensure that leaders and members - within and outside the government - always act in the interest of the people because the ANC was formed to repre-

sent and serve the people - and not merely its membership and leadership.

Neither must we allow political knowledge and connections acquired in positions of power in the movement and society to undermine interests of the people. In any phase of the revolution, protecting interests of the people is imperative to prevent what Gabriel Smirnow, in his book *Revolution Disarmed*, described as a situation whereby '...the working masses were looked upon as nothing more than reference points, very useful for holding big demonstrations and celebrating anniversaries ...'

While it must represent people across racial, class and cultural divide, the ANC should remain biased towards the historically oppressed and marginalized sections of society. With this understanding, we can and should ensure that our historically disadvantaged people are not 'looked upon as nothing more than reference points, very useful for holding big demonstrations and celebrating anniversaries...' We must do this because these people view our democratic movement, the ANC, as their only instrument through which they can liberate themselves. This requires us to identify political and organizational challenges, which have a potential to undermine capacity of the movement to lead people's struggles.

MEMBERS OF MEMBERS AND CADRES

Among these challenges is a tendency of members of the organization becoming members of other members. In the light of this, we need to intensify our programme of cadre development. Failure to do so will result in our movement being populated by followers of individuals and to the undesirable cult of personality. We would remember that Lenin cautioned his comrades about dangers of the cult of personality in the vanguard of the people.

Required at the current juncture is transformation of followers of individuals into cadres who can defend and sustain the movement in good and bad times. As a matter of fact, cadres are - at all times - required to defend the movement and to reassure those people who may have lost trust in the movement for whatever reason. We require cadres because it is them who embody values, principles and traditions that define the movement, while followers of individuals concern themselves with individuals, and not that which defines the ANC. With members who blindly follow other members populating the movement, *factionalism* is inevitable.

FACTIONALISM

It is common knowledge that *factionalism* is rife in our movement and for this reason let me reflect on the challenge of *factionalism*. *Factionalism* is a tendency that involves mobilization or "buying" of people to join the movement and bribing of members to ensure that certain individuals get elected into positions of leadership with a view to advance interests of a faction or members thereof. This is a demon, which breeds a divisive culture that is foreign in our democratic movement.

Like the phenomenon of cult of personality that undermines the organization by elevating an individual above the organization; *factionalism* elevates factions above the organization and *faction* leaders above constitutionally elected leaders, thereby undermining the ANC as an organization and its leadership as well as its ability to lead the revolution. Confirming this is the document titled *Conduct of a New Cadre* which states that 'members of factions within the organization owe their loyalty first to their own faction and secondly to the organization', something which is supposed to scare all those who understand that this tendency runs contrary to organizational discipline required of an ANC member.

Even more scary is the fact that *factionalism* does not only undermine organizational discipline, but also degenerates engagements among the comrades into politics of hate as it requires members to view and regard each other as enemies. This is something we have to fight head-on, if we are to sustain unity and cohesion of a movement, which was formed to unite the people. Writing about those tendencies which may weaken the movement, Comrade Mzala stated: 'the strength of our ideological creed must ... not only be in its unifying force, but also in its ability to withstand test of factionalism and ideological opposition.'

THE NEED FOR IDEOLOGICAL CLARITY, AND TOLERANCE OF DIFFERENT VIEWS

But, it is only with theoretical and ideological clarity that we will be able to identify tendencies that may compromise ANC's leadership of the revolution. Which means that the movement has a responsibility to ensure that its leaders and members - at all levels - understand the strategic objective, the character and content of our revolution; the historical vision and task of the ANC as well as the task of the membership to defend the revolution and the movement going forward.

However, we must always be mindful of the broad-church nature of the ANC and different strands of thinking within this movement and attempt to accommodate these strands without necessarily distorting the strategic objective of our revolution. We must do this knowing and understanding that we cannot unify the movement by

chasing out of the movement those we disagree with ideologically or otherwise, unless factual evidence shows that they are enemies of the revolution.

At all times, we must remember, "within the ANC, there are revolutionary democrats of various persuasions namely progressive nationalists, communists, socialists, social democrats and even narrow nationalists..." (8). Instead of labeling each other, revolutionary democrats within our movement are supposed to cooperate and engage each other on that which is required to stabilize and enable their beloved movement to lead and prosecute struggles of South African people. Something that must be done because, like Greek physician and thinker Alcmaeon, we firmly believe that "the health of an organism depend[s] on harmonious combination of contrasting qualities and forces, on their equilibrium..." "By harmony we mean a balanced and viable stable combination of elements and their connections, their internal and external interactions, all their emotions."

Failure to educate members and citizens about this dialectical perspective on unity of the movement may potentially dent the stature that the ANC has earned during its leadership of the struggles of the South African people for many decades. Needless to mention, this failure may present the opportunity to opportunists to claim that they have been leading the South African revolution, or to claim that they are better positioned to lead this revolution. Unless the ANC asserts its leadership of the revolution and educate its members and the current generation of citizens; certain elements in society will *opportunistically* occupy the space and educate people in a manner which projects them as leaders of the revolution.

Despite the apparent demonization of the ANC and the corresponding romanticisation of its ideological opposition which informs intellectual discourse in the fourth estate in our country - "the main immediate instrument for the achievement of the aims of our National Democratic Revolution is a mass movement capable of galvanizing all the classes" and that movement is the ANC because "the primary task of the ANC remains the mobilization of all the classes and strata that objectively stand to benefit from the cause of social change."

While there is nothing wrong with debating leadership, if the debate about the alliance being a strategic centre of power "is projected as replacing the strategic leadership role of the ANC it is counter-productive..." (14). Views may differ on political, ideological or other issues, but supposed advocates of unity are expected to prevent views from reducing comrades into real and permanent enemies.

UNITY OF THE MOVEMENT - A SACRED OBJECTIVE

Expected of us is fighting for unity because "unity of the movement is a sacred objective that we should spare no energy to preserve and nurture" (15). This unity is not for its own sake, but it is required because only a movement populated by those determined to unite it can defend and advance the revolution, a movement whose members are determined to enable it to execute its task of leading people's struggles and those who know that they "have a responsibility to inherit the task of taking on reigns of power and of leading our country forward to achieve the tasks that we have set in terms of the NDR [National Democratic Revolution]."

Let us therefore exercise maximum vigilance against forces which are hell-bent to disorganize, weaken and destroy our movement and undermine the state with a view to subvert our revolutionary agenda of fundamental transformation of society. We must do this having a clear understanding that with a weakened ANC, the masses of South African people will have no reliable and effective movement to lead their struggles and take South African revolution to its logical conclusion.

In his book titled *The 48 Laws of Power* Robert Greene paints an eye-opening picture of a situation in which the centre no longer holds. In cautioning people, Greene states that "with the leader gone the centre of gravity is gone; there is nothing to revolve around and everything falls apart". This is the situation against which we have to guard because opponents and enemies of the revolution may deliberately aim at the leading movement to weaken and bring it down and then look for the endless opportunities in the confusion that may ensue.

Thando Ntlembeza is a member of the ANC Eric Moscow Lusasen Branch, Langa Cape Town and a non-practicing attorney of the Cape High Court.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- (1) Morogoro Conference, 1969
- (2) See Jeff Goodwin (2001) *No Other Way Out: States and revolutionary movements, 1945 - 1991* at 42 where reference is made to Lenin making this point.
- (3) Lenin, *ibid*
- (4) Che Guevara quoted in Jon Lee Anderson (1997) *Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life* at 636-7
- (5) Mao Tsetung, "Talks at the Chengtu Conference", March 1958
- (6) In December 2005, when addressing Lekgotla of ANC Staff, former President of the ANC, Thabo Mbeki said the matter of cadres has always been an important part of what constitutes and defines the ANC.
- (7) Mzala "The Freedom Charter and its relevance today" an article written on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the Freedom Charter
- (8) Thando Ntlembeza "Now is not the time to go it alone" *Umrabulo* no. 30, November 2007 at 72. Also see SACP (2002) "Socialism is the Future, Build it Now: Strategy and Tactics of the SACP in the National Democratic Revolution" *Bua Komanisi* Vol 2, Issue 3 and Silumko Nondwangu "Not just an angry group of people" *Umrabulo* 30 at 35 where it is emphasized that the ideological currents within the movement express the multi-class character of the movement. While noting this, we have to be mindful of the fact that some people within and outside our ranks have a tendency to hide their self interest behind the ideological rhetoric.
- (9) A. Spirkin *On Dialectical Materialism*
- (10) *Ibid*.
- (11) Ronald Suresh Roberts (2007) *Fit to Govern - The Native intelligence of Thabo Mbeki*.
- (12) Secretary General of the ANC, Gwede Mantashe, quoting from the Central Committee (SACP) document (1977) "Class, National and Gender struggle in South Africa: The historic relationship between the SACP and the ANC", cited in the *African Communist*, April 2010, at 61
- (13) *Strategy and Tactics of the ANC*, 2007, at para 125
- (14) Gwede Mantashe, *African Communist*, April 2010, at 61
- (15) Zwelinzima Vavi. Address to the Special National Congress, *African Communist*, April 2010.
- (16) Remarks by ANC Thabo Mbeki, at the Caucus Lekgotla of ANC Staff in Parliament, December 2005
- (17) *Strategy and Tactics of the ANC*, 2007, par. 73
- (18) Robert Greene (2002) *The Concise 48 Laws of Power* at 170
- (19) *Ibid*. Here Robert Greene refers to an individual leader, not necessarily a leading organization, but the essence of what he says also applies to the ANC which leads the people and other democratic forces because weakening a leading organization will have similar effect on those who are led by that organization.

A response to Mufamadi

On the Tripartite Alliance

By BURTON JOSEPHS



Sydney Mufamadi hides behind an academic veneer to attack the incumbent leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) and its allies. He also questions the trajectory of the tripartite alliance since the 52nd ANC National Conference of December 2007. His attack was published in *The Thinker* (The Post-Polokwane "Leftists" vs "Nationalists" Faultline: An Unedifying Discourse, 12/2010), a journal that came into existence during the post-Polokwane convulsions and which comprises of a curious editorial mix of former embedded intellectuals.

Dr. Mufamadi bemoans the ideological-political degeneration that has materialised with the change in political leadership. Their crisis in role perception and analysis renders them unable to appreciate the impact of, and advance, a multi-class approach to social transformation. These "democratising icons of Polokwane" do not understand the nexus between race and class.

Their dichotomous equation of the ANC with conservative interests, on the one hand, and COSATU and the SACP with radical interests, on the other hand, is anchored in this erroneously conceived nationalist - socialist dichotomy (2010: 41). He remarks as follows:

The current descent into politico-ideological atrophy can be traced back to the manner in which the pre-Polokwane political dynamics were handled... The prevailing intra-Alliance acrimony is characterised by "political analysts" and "ideologues" alike, as an exchange of monologues between the "Nationalists" and the "Leftists" who are trying to come to grips with their uneasy co-habitation within the broad church that is the ANC...

The talking heads that ostensibly represent the antagonistic units have not helped either. They, too, have joined in the business of decanting the old wine, which discursively stirs up imaginings of the ANC

as an innately rightist force and naturalises the "leftness" of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). The binary narrative adds unhelpful inflections to the understanding of alliance politics.

His Left definition ("an epistemic community which crucially includes the ANC") does not provide a cogent exposition of its constitutive forces, their location, political programme and the strategies that are required to assert working class hegemony in society. He alleges, nonetheless, that the current milieu militates against any assertion of Left hegemony given the "obtuse ineptitude of those who are supposed to be intellectually and politically discerning."

Our history actually reflects a rich intellectual tradition, with activists such as Jack Simons and Ray Alexander, Govan Mbeki and Ruth First having pioneered the race-class debate (Simons and Simons 1969; Mbeki 1964, 1991; First 1983). The output of "collective intellectuals" within the ANC-led alliance was linked to practical tasks in furthering the objectives of liberation over the years (Suttner 2005). Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM) activists also contributed to our intellectual history under oppression. Numerous scholars illuminated the nexus between race, class and ideology by focusing respectively on the state (Greenberg, 1980; O'Meara, 1980; Magubane, 1979; Wolpe, 1988), the period of industrialisation and urbanization (Marks and Atmore 1980; Marks and Rathbone 1982) and the transformation of agrarian relations (Bundy 1988; Keegan 1987).

The revival of trade unionism and mass resistance during the 1980s resuscitated the race-class, apartheid-capitalism debate among activists and scholars alike. A proper characterization of our social system had implications for practical, day-to-day politics as it enabled us to identify the motive forces for change. It also necessitated the adoption of an appropriate strategy and tactics to defeat the apartheid. Analyses about social system, at a public level, featured prominently in publications such as the *African Communist*, *Sechaba*, the *South African Labour Bulletin* (SALB) and *Work-in-Progress*. This analysis has guided our construction of a non-racial and democratic society, in accordance with the ideals enshrined in the Freedom Charter.

Significant progress has been made during the past sixteen years in deracialising the state and society. Common symbols, instruments and access to institutions that guarantee equality have contributed to forging a national identity. The transformation of the economy has been slow though: ownership remains largely skewed in

favour of our white compatriots, the skills deficit persists (exacerbated by a skills flight which encompasses all national groups) and the gap between rich and poor continues to widen. The consequential social exclusion, with its violent cataclysms as we have witnessed in recent years, poses a real threat to the establishment of an inclusive and egalitarian society, i.e., the "people's country" that we envisaged during the struggle years.

Dr Mufamadi's gripe, however, seems more about the form of discursive analysis within the tripartite alliance, which he finds unsettling. There is no need to disagree with him on this score as the personalization, and also racialisation, of disagreements continues to unsettle many activists within the alliance and society at large. This new public political phenomenon, which seems to cut across the political spectrum is an unfortunate and destructive development which deflects attention from the strategic tasks which should preoccupy all activists. We must, at the same time, guard against a form of revisionism that de-historicise the roots of contemporary problems in the movement. Comrade Sydney and his cohorts were pioneers of the "alien behaviour" and "foreign tendencies" which we are struggling to exorcise from our ranks. They contributed to perfecting a culture of intolerance, abuse and mistrust among activists over the years. Their inauspicious legacy includes, but is not limited to, the "bureaucratization of the party and state; development of social distance; arrogance of power; ideological decline among rank-and-file; corruption and use of state institutions to settle inner-party battles; party life revolves around winning elections and sharing the spoils of power – positions and state resources." (2010: 10). Their ruthless exercise of power, intellectual thuggery and sense of indispensability bred revulsion throughout activist ranks, as was demonstrated by the outcome of National Conference.

Comrade Sydney's reincarnation as a voice of reason among a riotous crowd is but a shield to perpetuate factionalism whereby the defeated leaders purportedly are projected as the intellectuals and virtuous segment of the alliance, whilst the "hysterical firebrands" constitute an "expedient coalition" of dumb and wayward elements. It's a fallacious belief that, sadly, resonates among some sections of the middle class.

We were faced with many challenges at different conjunctures during the struggle years. Various alliances were generated between liberation forces of which the relationship between the ANC and the SACP has proved to be the

most enduring. Addressing the 65th anniversary of the SACP during 1986, the year after the significant "People's Action for People's Power" conference in Kabwe, Zambia, Secretary - General Alfred Nzo remarked:

The African National Congress is solidly united... It shall not at any time be persuaded to forgo its alliance with the South African Communist Party as the history of our struggle has unmistakably demonstrated that it is the unbreakable unity of all the democratic and progressive forces that will successfully mobilise and rally all sections of the oppressed masses of our people to speedily destroy the hated apartheid system. It is appropriate to recall here the statement of our President, Comrade OR Tambo, who said, on the occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the South African Communist Party, when referring to its alliance with the ANC, that 'ours is not merely a paper alliance, created at conference tables and formalised through the signing of documents and representing only an agreement of leaders. Our alliance is a living organism that has grown out of struggle.'

COSATU became a part of a new ANC - SACP - COSATU liberation alliance subsequent to its launch in 1985. The federation filled a void that was left with the exile and later dissolution of the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) (Luckhardt and Wall 1980; Baskin 1991). It has brought to the alliance a constituency which the ANC, on its own, will have difficulty in mobilizing. COSATU and the SACP champion primarily working class interests and the establishment of socialism. Issues such as the eradication of unemployment, poverty, underdevelopment and disease have accordingly generated diverse policy proposals among the allies, all of which are predicated upon their ideology, composition and interests. These issues have featured prominently in the public wrangling that we have now become accustomed to...

The history against apartheid, as well as the common objectives of the allies, i.e., the establishment of a non-racial and democratic society, gets frequently invoked in attempts to quell the discord. The key argument that can be gleaned from public statements is that the need for the continued existence of the tripartite alliance is informed by the persisting inequalities and the need to eradicate these collectively. The need for the continued existence of the tripartite alliance also gets emphasized from time to time.

The 52nd National Conference emphasized the need for unity, the strengthening of alliance structures, "an approach on how the alliance manages with differences and discipline" and resolved to resuscitate political engagement

through the Alliance Summits. The purpose of these summits is in need of a review. Does it serve as a platform to assess socio - economic transformation, thereby ensuring a coherent focus on achievements and unaccomplished tasks, or as a forum to resolve contemporary disputes between allies?

The 3rd National General Council (NGC) in September 2010 also paid attention to the persisting acrimony between allies and it emphasized political unity and discipline, particularly in the wake of the protracted public sector strike. The resolution regarding the tripartite alliance states:

The NGC agree that the Alliance was formed out of struggle and out of a shared vision as articulated in the Freedom Charter. It is based on the understanding that each Alliance component enjoys political independence from one another, but also acknowledges the role and responsibilities of the ANC as the strategic centre of power and leader of the Alliance.

Council further called on the entire ANC to remain focused on the task of building a strong and united Alliance that is capable of defending and advancing the tasks of the National Democratic Revolution.

Council emphasised the need to continue to engage on key theoretical questions so that we can continue to sharpen our understanding of the tasks of the NDR.

Council endorsed the NEC's call that the Alliance leadership avoid public spats, because this alien behavior undermines the integrity and standing of the Alliance among ordinary people who have huge respect for the role played by individual Alliance partners in the struggle for freedom. In this regard, the Alliance should, among others, discuss a joint programme of renewal, which should include matters of discipline and revolutionary conduct among the leadership of the Alliance at all levels (ANC 2010:24).

In his closing address to delegates, President Zuma reflected on the current frosty relations and cautioned against conduct, which undermines the unity and continued existence of the tripartite alliance. President Zuma remarked:

Each Alliance component partner has a political responsibility to guard against tendencies that threaten the unity of the Alliance. The Alliance is a unique political entity, and none of us must celebrate when it faces challenges. All the bold headlines about the imminent death of the Alliance are a waste of time and ink because the Alliance will live for a long time to come...

It is important comrades that we should not play around with this Alliance...

Suffice to say that the bold headlines about the imminent death of the Alliance are grossly exaggerated. It will live for a long time to come...

Deputy President Kgalema Montlana echoed similar sentiment when he addressed a gathering in Johannesburg to celebrate COSATU's 25th anniversary:

Challenges embedded in the post-94 period will continue to test our sense of unity and the direction that we take as an alliance ... In the 25 years since its formation, COSATU has added immense weight to the balance of forces in our country. Of note is the reality that the tripartite alliance remains inherently indivisible, defined by the vision of creating a South Africa that is united, non-racial, non-sexist, just and democratic. To the extent that the underlying historical conditions that necessitated the formation of the alliance still exist, albeit in different incarnation, to that extend will the alliance live on, focused on this historical duty to serve the needs of human society. Accordingly, a cons(c)iousness that the struggles of the worke(r)s today still cannot be separated from the struggles of the communities in which the workers still live permeate our society.

The political environment has shifted from an oppressive to a democratic society. There has thus been a consequent change of the conditions under which strategic objectives are being advanced and this, in turn, warrants an assessment of the best strategic location from where allies intend to advance, and realize, their revolutionary objectives. These issues require critical consideration if we want to mitigate the persistent intra-alliance acrimony in the long run. This intervention is an effort to advance the debate beyond the focus on the persistent public acrimony, which is a manifestation, rather than the cause of the acrimony, and also has its own limitations.

To start with, the rules of engagement that should provide a binding framework for the conduct of allies are not clear. This makes it difficult to assess when such rules have been breached, the corrective measures to be applied and who within the tripartite alliance decides on a course of action. This lacuna provides space for the ANC, SACP and COSATU respectively to make public pronouncements on policy issues, as each function in accordance with its own framework and protocols. Defining rules of engagement has the potential to mend the gaps in the functioning of the tripartite alliance.

Secondly, there has been much public wrangling over various ANC policies. At the heart of this contestation is not the various policies

per se that are proposed by the allies, much as this appears to be the case, but the policy development process and how this impact on the functioning of the tripartite alliance. Policy issues that have gained currency within ANC branches get debated during the mid-term General Council formalised at the Policy Conference and are presented to the National Conference for adoption. It is these policies that are ultimately implemented by the state. COSATU and the SACP seem eager to exert greater influence over this process although their views of an alternative policy development model, in the context of the structure of the current relationship, is yet to be unveiled. Such a proposal will, without a doubt, provide for robust debate extending beyond the alliance because it will reveal their conception of power relations between the allies.

Thirdly, there are no protocols that delineate the roles of the allies vis-à-vis the transformation of the state and society. The priority during the apartheid era and CODESA interregnum was the defeat of apartheid. The establishment of democracy has profoundly changed the contribution of the allies, and their impact on social transformation. The ANC exists as a ruling party who commands control of state institutions and whose policies that get implemented, as referred to earlier in this article, affect every sphere of society. COSATU and the SACP operate outside the framework of state power, and their impact is further constrained by the fact that their members who are politicians serve at the behest of the ANC (whose policies they must implement). The fundamental question, which consequently arises, is whether COSATU and the SACP aspire to contest and wield state power. Do they have the capacity to secure a significant presence in government, and change the trajectory of politics in our country? Their various policy proposals, notwithstanding its radicalism, are unlikely to impact on the transformation of the state and society (unless there is congruence with ANC policies or such policies have managed to gain currency within the ANC). The public wrangling is merely a manifestation of this fundamental issue.

Fourthly, no provision precludes the SACP and COSATU from contesting political elections. There is neither any known agreement that restricts them to operate from outside the framework of formal state politics. This is relevant given the commitment of both organizations to advance working class interests and establish socialism. Is the course of socialism advanced, and working class hegemony asserted, by remaining a marginal force outside of government? Given the desire for the continued existence of the tripartite alliance, will the allies

cease to cooperate, and the alliance be terminated, when more than one ally is represented in government? Or will the relationship merely assume a different character when more than one ally is represented in government?

The National Conference resolutions (2007) emphasise the pursuit of "action for the joint programme of social transformation" and for "better ways to respond to new challenges." Conference also considered the pursuit of strategic objectives by allies in manner determined by each of them:

Conference confirms the Policy Conference assertion that we should respect the right of individual Alliance partners to discuss and arrive at their own decisions on how they seek to pursue their strategic objectives. Consistent with this principle, the ANC will continue to determine, in its own structures and processes, how best to advance its own strategic objectives.

The ANC will thus not prescribe to COSATU and the SACP how they should define themselves, advance their strategic objectives or determine the strategic location in pursuit of their objectives. It is their ultimate responsibility. All the allies must accept such decisions. Recent developments relating to the civil society conference has been projected as either: a COSATU-led initiative to strengthen civil society (not dissimilar to the ANC National Conference resolution on the need to strengthen the alliance, mass democratic movement and civil society, yet to be taken forward), or an attempt to foster an anti-ANC coalition geared towards "regime change." It has, more than anything, highlighted the contradictions that get accentuated in our quest to resolve the problems. To some extent does it question our commitment to the right of allies "to discuss and arrive at their own decisions on how they seek to pursue their strategic objectives."

2010 marked twenty-five years of the existence of COSATU. It's an existence that consists of victories and defeats, triumphs and mistakes. COSATU has fought tirelessly over the years to improve the conditions of workers; it has transcended the confines of shop-floor politics and contributed to the construction of a democratic society (Baskin 1991; Buhlungu 2010). Its principled defense of our democratic political space, i.e., resisting a degeneration into barbarism, generated numerous (personalized) attacks on its leaders during the past decade. In a wide-ranging reflection on the origins and contemporary challenges that face the tripartite alliance, former COSATU Secretary-General Jay Naidoo (2010) remarked:

Over the past few years, COSATU has been a powerful voice... Yet it is disturbing that in the past few weeks, COSATU has wasted precious hours defending its constitutional right to hold hands with civil society movements, which came together to discuss the social justice charter and how to deepen democracy. I would have expected there to be unanimity instead of accusations "oppositionalism" or the creation of an equivalent to Zimbabwe's MDC. How have we descended to such a level?...

I was the general secretary that led COSATU into the strategic alliance with the ANC and the SACP... and independent organization that sought a principled alliance on the basis of a reconstruction and development programme that would attack the foundations of the social crises of poverty, inequality and joblessness. Never was the intention to make COSATU the conveyor belt of any organization. I would also be disappointed if COSATU chose to ignore its traditions and abandon its solidarity with democratic, grassroots organizations that are trying to find breathing space in our society today. If these organizations and movements are to be crowded out then we are left with to reside in the shadow of a heavy state, which no one wants, not even the government...

Now, more than ever, we need a social contract if we are to tackle them (structural problems of the economy). No one stakeholder has the solution. A strong social consensus, the kind that underpinned the RDP, has to be negotiated and real trust cultivated back into society.

The current alliance acrimony is not about a (mis)understanding of the race-class, capitalism-socialism debate (and how this influences the public conduct of activists), but is informed by the structure and modus operandi of the alliance in this changed and democratic context. The definition of the respective roles of the allies, and the determination of the best strategic location to pursue their objectives are central to the acrimony, and also to its resolution.

The assertion of an erroneous race-class conception among leaders of the tripartite alliance exists only in the minds of Sydney Mufamadi and others who seem to remain eternally stuck in a Polokwane time-warp where nothing and no-one has moved on. We must debate the issues that have been raised in this paper as a means to arrest the current paralysis. The pursuit of a factionalist agenda is unlikely to assist us in this endeavour.

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The Next Commodity Boom

Unlocking Africa's Mineral Resources


By VICTOR LUVHENGU

Africa experienced an accelerated economic growth from 2002 to 2008 as a result of commodities boom in the global economy during that period. The average annual growth was at the 6 percent rate. That growth came to a halt due to the 2008 financial crisis which was followed by the world-wide economic recession in 2009. As a result of global recession, commodity prices fell sharply and growth in Africa declined to 0.9 percent (1).

However, despite previous positive growth rates, there is a general consensus that the growth did not translate into any significant poverty reduction in Africa. Africa's resource-rich countries continue to sit at the bottom of human development indicators. The paradox of high poverty in the midst of abundance natural resources still exists and there is evidence of growing inequality in many African resource-rich countries.

The problem lies with the fact that many African resource-rich countries have failed to harness abundant natural resources for economic development and the elimination of extreme poverty. Natural resources are static, but human institutions (economic, political and social networks) define these resources and their use. There is obviously something wrong with the African institutions. Our institutions have failed to take advantage of abundant natural resources to transform their economies and reduce poverty. This inability to set proper institutional policies will definitely lead to further failures to capitalize on future commodity price booms. This should be an issue of concern amongst African policy-makers and create a sense of urgency to find solutions.

The global economy is recovering and commodity markets will rise again. Growth prospects in the four biggest-emerging markets (Brazil, Russia, India and China, the BRIC countries) that will pull global growth remain very positive. According to the 2010 IMF Global Economic Outlook report, Brazil will grow by 5.5%, Russia by 4%, India by 8.8% and China by 10% (2). This growth will once again push upward demand for commodities. Africa and other com-



modity-rich economies could soon again derive the benefits of rising commodity prices. In 2011 all the commodity prices are expected to reach their pre-crisis era levels.

For Africa to reap the benefits of the next boom, the continent has to start putting proper structures to harvest the commodity windfalls. For this to happen there are number of policy considerations that the continent has to examine. Amongst others, African policy-makers should reconsider their regulatory frameworks, diversification, natural resource funds and better partnerships.

REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

First, it is crucial to set the right regulatory framework in terms of investment agreements and proper systems to monitor and evaluate the mining industry. In the past many investments agreements were negotiated at the low base with huge tax holidays and also lacked transparency. For example, in Zambia, in late 1990's when the government lured mining investors, ten-year tax holiday was granted. When the copper prices skyrocketed in 2002-2007 the country did not

reap many benefits. After facing a mounting pressure from the civil society in 2008, the government introduced a new tax regime, but this regime was not implemented due to the global recession. In future, to accommodate both parties (the host country and an investor), the ideal investment agreements should take into account the downswing and upswing of commodity prices to ensure "win-win" agreements.

Furthermore, the mineral industry has to be monitored effectively. Most countries do not have the capacity to do operational, fiscal or environmental audits. Therefore, the end result is little tax collection, environmental degradation and poor safety standards in the industry. African countries should look at how they could strengthen their tax regimes and environmental and health regulation authorities.

DIVERSIFICATION

Secondly, investing natural resource rents to develop other economic sectors is a matter of urgency in many resource-rich African countries. The recent global economic recession is the evidence that the price of commodities in the global market is highly volatile. During the 2009 recession, prices of almost every commodity plummeted. Commodity-dependent economies suffered a drastic revenue deficit and national budgets were severely strained. If an economy is diversified other sources of national revenue could be created. Diversification is the only way to achieve sustainable development. In fact sustainable development through resource depletion depends upon the rents from resource extraction being converted into other sources of income (3).

Diversification is also a way to give African economies a structural transformation away from heavily mineral dependency. Efforts to diversify are hampered by the fact that reliance on mineral deposits usually confines resource-dependent countries in the illusion of "nature-given wealth" and delays investments in activities that would help speed the productive knowledge (4). To move away from this illusion, African countries should use resource rents for massive investment in infrastructure and human capital to boost productivity and skills. Investment in power supply, water, transport, and communications infrastructure are of particular relevance to industrial development. Furthermore, when it comes to boosting skills in the economy, African resource-rich countries do not link extraction of natural resources with human resource development strategies. Apart from providing job opportunities in the mining industry, countries should invest in education and skills training in the broader sense of the economy.

IN CONCLUSION

the vast mineral deposits of Africa have had little development impact over the years. Despite, the previous years of commodity boom, Africa has failed to design a sustainable investment path or to use the resource revenue to promote human and economic development. Sadly, mineral resources do not last forever and right decisions need to be taken now. The challenge to policy-makers in Africa is to respond quickly because as the global economy recovers, commodity prices are set to rise again. Therefore, African policy-makers should reconsider the right regulatory framework, investing revenues in infrastructure and skills to diversify the economies, saving for future crises and getting the right partnerships.


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Multi-polarity presents unknown risks and exaggerated opportunities

By ZAMANI SAUL



▼ Introduction

In assessing the conditions of struggle the 1969 Strategy and Tactics asserts "the Strategy and Tactics of our revolution require for their formulation and understanding a full appreciation of the interlocking and interweaving of international, African and Southern African development which play on our situation".

The 1997 Strategy and Tactics further articulates that "a proper understanding of a given balance of forces is critical in defining the tactics that the liberation movement should adopt at each stage of transformation" and warns "to ignore this would be to fall victim to voluntarism and revolutionary militancy that has nothing to do with the revolution. Such populism can in fact lead to the defeat of the revolution itself".

When the ANC was formed in 1912 it was just after the decline in 1875 of British hegemony and just two years before the World War I broke out in July 1914 and roughly about twenty-eight years before World War II. During this period there was a lack of a hegemon.

Soon after World War II the world was plunged into bipolarity, characterised by the distribution of power in which two states have the majority of economic, military and cultural influence internationally or regionally. Obscure or explicit spheres of influence developed around the two superpowers. During the Cold War for instance most Western and liberal democratic states would fall under the influence of the United States of America, while most communist states would fall under the influence of the Soviet Union. These superpowers were pre-occupied by manoeuvres for the support of the unclaimed areas.

In December 25, 1991 the Soviet Union ceased to exist, eliminating the second Cold War "pole" and launching the debate about the new world order. The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a unipolar world, where the distribution of power is in one state, with most economic, military and cultural influences. Charles Leadbeater explains that in the game of global politics there are four main interconnected boards. On the highest board a game of *military power* is being played out. Below the military board is the board on which the *economic game* of commerce and trade is being played. On the third board the game of *culture, knowledge, value and meaning* is being played. Finally on the lowest board, the game of *politics* is being played, in this game government, multinationals and international institutions argue incessantly about the rules of playing the other games. He warns that this is a very unpredictable and complex game across the four very different boards as the boards are all interconnected. Moves on one board affect the others, especially if that move is made by the US as it is a big player across all four boards.

Each nation-state have the responsibility to make foreign economic policy choices and these choices tend to be the most important factor shaping the nature of the international economy. This document agrees that foreign policy choices are important; but argues that the feature of multi-polarity is inherently embedded with twists and turns that will generate risks. It further argues that multipolarity will create a favourable environment for developing countries and regions to strongly pursue the implementation of a progressive global agenda.

▼ 1997 Strategy and Tactics

In analysing the character of the international situation the 2007 Strategy and Tactics alludes that "our transition was an element of a dynamic political process of a world redefining itself with the end of the cold war". Looking at Africa's rebirth, it asserts "the African renaissance should consolidate her collective sovereignty, both in the fight to change the current maladministration of international resources and power..." Whilst it recognised that we are in a post cold-war era it did not make any particular reference to a unipolar but appreciated the fact that there was maladministration of resources and power in the world. It is vexing that the 1997 Strategy and Tactics, just seven years after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, never made any particular reference to unipolarity.

The 1997 Strategy and Tactics then advocated for a "new world order" which was loosely char-

The 1997 Strategy and Tactics then advocated for a "new world order" which was loosely characterised as follows:

- African rebirth,
- Cooperation among countries of the South, which will ensure the new world order is based not merely on the existing economic and political power of the current advanced industrial countries,
- Creative bilateral and multilateral engagements with developed countries to help ensure their approach to world affairs benefits humanity as a whole, and
- Transformation of multilateral institutions, primary among which is the United Nations and its agents.

▼ 2002 Preface to the Strategy and Tactics

2002 Stellenbosch conference accepted the basic thrust of the 1997 Strategy and Tactics but recognised the fact that there are new developments that took place that had an impact on the balance of forces both globally and domestically. Hence, the conference resolved to add a preface to the 2002 edition of the Strategy and Tactics. The preface "aims at assisting in the interpretation of our Strategy and Tactics in the light of the new developments and experiences gained in this period (1997 – 2002)".

The preface accurately identified the new opportunities that have emerged in the global arena since 1997, which were the formation of the African Union, the adoption of NEPAD, the outcomes of the World Summit on Sustainable Development and an increased number and prominence of multilateral bodies for the developmental interest of the South. Unlike the 1997 Strategy and Tactics the 2002 preface expressly recognised the unipolar world and tossed a cautionary note that "we must not underestimate the difficulties posed by a unipolar world. Nor should we exaggerate these difficulties and miss the opportunities". The preface goes further to articulate that this global situation is characterised by "unilateralism and the pursuit of militarised global agenda".

▼ 2007 Strategy and Tactics and the 2010 National General Council

2007 Strategy and Tactics in its analysis of the global balance of forces and the character of the international situation asserts that "today, the system of capitalism holds sway across the world; underpinned by a unique dominance of one hyper-power. This situation of unipolarity also has secondary multi-polar features reflected

in geo-political blocs among developed and developing countries, and the historical resurgence of China, India, Brazil and Russia as centres of growth and development. These multi-polar features require continuing research and engagement".

The 2007 Strategy and Tactics was spot on in its analysis in three critical areas, i.e.

- The global dominance of capitalism with its belly in the United States of America;
- The development at a secondary level of multi-polar features, and that
- This multi-polar feature requires continuing engagement and research.

The 3rd National General Council (NGC) held almost three years after the 2007 National Conference reaffirmed the characterisation of the global balance of forces by the 2007 Strategy and Tactics. In its analysis on International Relations the NGC noted "The current international balance of forces have seen a shift from a unipolar world where the United States was a hegemonic power towards an emerging multipolar world with the increased presence of Asia, in the process decisively tilting the international balance of forces. China and India are emerging as key players in geopolitics and we have seen the emergence of several regional groups of the 'South' like BRIC, IBSA, etc".

▼ The US hegemony and the unipolar world

Robert Gilpin, a renowned scholar in international political economy, Stephen Krasner and other scholars from the realist tradition have identified the distribution of power among states as a central factor in explaining the openness and stability of the international economy. They then became ardent advocates of "*hegemonic stability theory*" (HST) which was first espoused by Charles Kindleberger in the 1970s. HST focuses on the role of the leading state, for example, Great Britain in 19th and the US in the 20th centuries and how changes in the distribution of capabilities affect the world economy.

HST suggests that the overwhelming dominance of one country was a necessary condition for the existence of an open and stable world economy. The role of the hegemon is to coordinate and discipline other countries so that each could feel secure to open its market; it principally provides system order and stability. Conversely, the theory asserted that the decline of a


hegemon tends to be associated with economic closure, instability and creation of regional blocks. This argument is substantiated with the following historical accounts:

- British hegemony in the 19th century was a major factor contributing to trade liberalisation, its decline after 1875 led to a decline in free trade;
- Post World War I the US was the world's strongest economic power, but steadfastly refused to take the leadership role that Britain could no longer play. The lack of a hegemon in the interwar years resulted in increased protectionism and isolationism culminating in the Great Depression of the early 1930's; and
- The emergence of the US as a global hegemon after World War II resulted in the re-emergence of an open and stable international economic regime.

There are scholars, social activists and politicians that question the assumption that hegemony is necessary and sufficient. Some argue that international actors can and do provide goods for themselves through bargaining, mutual cooperation and punishment of cheaters. So the appropriate model for the international political economy is "collective action" and not the existence of a hegemon.

The dangers of isolationism seemed to have been well learned by American policymakers after the Great Depression and World War I. Hence after World War II the US quickly assumed a leadership role and moved forward to create an open international trade system based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), stable monetary systems founded on the Bretton Woods system and the Marshall Plan. Many scholars argue that it is the US leadership that helped create the conditions necessary for the steady economic growth experienced in many industrial countries up to the 1970s and the rapid development of countries such as Japan and South Korea.

In the same breath many concerns about US power were since the 1960s, since the 11 September 2001 terrorists attack and recently after the invasion of Iraq. The stability of the international currency markets was also disrupted by American behaviour. The simultaneous pursuit of the Vietnam War and the Great Society program fuelled inflation in the US, which was exported abroad because of the role of the dollar in international exchange. This led to the erosion of the dollar's value as the world reserve currency. Ultimately these problems led to the



US abandonment of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system and to an emergence of a more volatile era of floating exchange rates. The US war in Afghanistan in March 2002 and the invasion of Iraq on 16 March 2003 saw the rise again of a disturbing era of unilateralism and militarisation of the global agenda. This period saw an exploitative hegemon that is more concerned with relative gains and its own self-interest. Susan Turner asserts that "the Iraq war demonstrated the peril of unchecked superpower – a peril both China and Russia tried to highlight in their promotion of multipolarity".

The US economic advantage over other countries seemed to be rapidly dissipating, while other countries were catching up. In response protectionist sentiments within the US grew, leading to many domestic challenges to the traditional policy of free trade. Hegemony is inherently unstable and according to Koehane there are three specific reasons for the US hegemonic decline:

- The tendency of the US to overextend itself in both military and economic terms,
- The tendency of free riders to gain more from economic openness than the US, and
- The emergence of more dynamic and com-

petitive economies that challenge the US's predominant position.

Susan Turner adds the fourth reason, which is the self-proclaimed authority of the US to interfere in domestic affairs of other states. The classical example was in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989 the US suspended arms sales to China and attempted to make China's most favoured nation (MFN) status contingent upon its improvement of its human rights record. Like the rest of the world China was subject to one "policing" superpower.

▼ Multi-polarity of international relations

Nearly two decades ago, Charles Krauthammer predicted that "multipolarity will come in time ... in perhaps another generation or so there will be great powers co-equal with the US, and the world in structure will resemble the pre-World War I era." Since the beginning of the 21st Century the apparent actualisation of this prediction has caused many, even us in the movement, to believe that the world now stands on the precipice of a multipolar order. In 2009 US President Barack Obama assumed

office with what many deemed a multipolar worldview, prioritising rising powers such as Brazil, China, India and Russia. In her July 2009 address to the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, said "we will lead by inducing greater cooperation among a greater number of actors and reducing competition, tilting the balance away from a multipolar world towards a multipartner world". This vulgarisation of the imminent reality was placed in proper context in January 2010 by US Vice President; addressing the media in Ukraine he said "...the US is working towards a multipolar world".

The reality is that the global economy is going through a period of rapid change, and the centre of the world, both economically and strategically, is shifting to the East, mainly Asia. With the global GDP growth for 2010 is anticipated to be 4% and about of 70% of that growth will come from new markets mainly BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China). BRIC nations represent about 40% of the world's population and 20% of the global economic output. Other major emerging economies such as South Korea and South Africa are watching the group rise with interest, as are oil-producing countries that include some of the world's biggest spenders, but with the least political leverage. Whilst these developments are important to note it will be foolhardy to be dismissive of the economic clout of the West. The consolidation of Europe into a euro-zone economy will also constitute a formidable polar with significant leverage within the West.

In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square Massacre and the US suspension of the arm sales to China, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, said in 1991 "The US hegemonic stance and its attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of other states pose the greatest danger to socialist China" and suggested that in order "to weaken pressure from Washington, China must broaden relations with Russia, South Korea, and other neighbouring countries". Two years later, China turned to Russia, a country with its own qualms with US ascendance. It is in this context that China and Russia established a "constructive partnership" in 1994. In 1996, the word "strategic" replaced "constructive". They both viewed the relationship as counterweight to the perceived or real negative trends of the unipolar world.

China's 11th Five Year Plan states, "The trend towards multipolarity in international politics is developing amid twists and turns, and voices for multilateralism are growing in the

international community, imposing effective constraints on hegemonism and power politics and making it possible for China to manage big power relations, oppose foreign interference, and defend the national interest". Russia on the other side, with its damaged demeanor and dramatic policy shifts has emerged a quite different champion of multipolarity – one which is content with directly challenging the hegemony of the US and perhaps even making it possible for China to ascend. Elizabeth Wishnick initially explained the partnership between Russia and China by saying that "Russia, a declining great power, aims to recover its lost status, while China, a rising power, resists efforts to constrain its emerging global role". What this means is that these two balancing powers in the imminent multipolar world have different motives.

China had a clear target to grow the size of their economy and rival Japan. The \$43 billion spent by China in 2008 to successfully host the Olympic games was to bring an end to 150 years of perceived humiliation, when Beijing's national power ebbed while Hong Kong and other lucrative trading ports were surrendered to the British and the Americans. This disgrace was followed by the worst subjugation of all, by the brutal occupation of the country by the Japanese. Japanese are the historic rivals of China in the centuries-old struggle for domination of Asia. In August 2010 the Chinese economy outperformed the Japanese, and is now the second biggest country economy after the US. Over the past ten years Japan and US economic strength and influence has been receding. The US mired down on slow growth, the Afghan war, the \$800 billion Iraq war and obsessed with prospects of another act of terrorism.

It is important to note that China is a long, long way from becoming a superpower. China has got a reputation as the lowest-cost producer and the world's biggest merchandise exporter and is quietly moving up the ladder as the technological innovator, that's where the greatest revenue is. The country is running a huge trade surplus and is financing the US trillion-dollar budget deficit. There is still enormous poverty, about 300 million people in Western China are living on fifteen dollars a month and are desperate to benefit from the year on year double digit growth.

In 2009 the GDP per capita in China stood at \$7,600. Hence, the effort by the Chinese government to create 20 - 25 million new jobs a year as the young Chinese stream to the coastal cities

looking for new opportunities. This same economic pattern finds expression in India, whilst the volume of economic output per country is high; the living conditions of ordinary Indians are not significantly improving and has a very low GDP per capita, which in 2009 stood at \$3,700. It is important to note that the GDP per capita in South Africa is almost twice as high as China and almost four times higher than India. What this actually means is that there is great need and demand for socio-economic investment in both countries.

In this balancing act it is important to note that both China and India share borders and account for one third of world population, an incredible market. In the imminent multipolar world there will be no hegemon or superpower but balancing centres of power; this will be regions and individual countries with sizable influence or leverage in the manner in which the world economy, politics and stability are structured. The countries and regions that will have leverage in the multipolar balancing game are, but not limited, the US, China, India, Russia, Japan, EU, Brazil, Africa as a continent and the OPEC countries. This spread of influence, in a multipolar, encompasses enormous risks and plenty of opportunities.

▼ Twists and turns in a multipolar world

The bipolar left a trail of destruction, and an unjust and unstable world order. This was exacerbated by the unipolar order that advocated unilateralism and a militarised global agenda. The possible impact of a multi-polar world is a severely contested debate among scholars, social activists and politicians. There is a general consensus that in a multipolar there will be more than two balancing centres of power, many countries and regions will have leverage in the multipolar balancing game.

There is a very strong argument from some scholars that multipolarity might bring global instability, if trading blocs resort to protectionism and are inward looking. Many rogue world leaders not committed to free and open society based on a culture of human rights tradition might easily exploit the situation to perpetuate their self-interests. This will lead to twists and turns in the global political environment which might be characterised by both sincere and mischievous political manoeuvres by the balancing centres of powers. These political manoeuvres might be very exploitative and further reinforce the current neo-colonial structure of the economy of developing countries, as these balancing

centres of power might be "elites in the raw material sector" and will flood developing countries with high value goods and services as they are moving up the value chain.

Classical realists, on the other hand, hold that multipolar systems are more stable than a bipolar system. Even neo-realists who focus on global security agree that multipolar system may be more stable than a bipolar system, because one significant advantage of a multipolar is that there will be consistent shifting of alliances which might lead to a stalemate balance of power, in which neither side would want to attack each other or wage petty or proxy wars. These changes in alliances for security purposes will also lead to major twists and turns due to the complexity of global security challenges and a threat of nuclear weapons.

The change in the global balance of forces takes place in the cinema capitalist market economy, which predominantly constitutes the axis of these twists and turns. The locomotion for the capitalist global economy is globalisation, and globalisation is ruthless in marginalising developing economies. Capitalism is an adaptive and evolutionary social system that mutates and evolves in response to changing environment. Kaletsky Anatole argues that "When capitalism is seriously threatened by a systemic crisis, a new version emerges that is better suited to the changing environment and replaces the previously dominant form". Once we recognise that capitalism is not static set of institutions, but an evolutionary system that reinvents and reinvigorates itself through crises, what happened in the 2007 – 2009 global financial crisis, in the 1998 the global economic crisis triggered in South East Asia, the global inflation of the 1960s and 1970s, the 1930 economic depression and Napoleonic Wars of 1803 – 15. If the twists and turns in the multipolar world are strategically managed the economic rules and political institutions of capitalism have and can undergo profound change.

▼ Conclusion: consolidation of Africa as a regional balancing centre of power

These "interlocking and interweaving international developments" will find concrete expression in Africa. Hence, the urgent need to accelerate continental economic integration as the imminent advent of a multipolar world poses a much bigger threat to the unity of our continent. The threat will be due to unprecedented scramble for Africa's natural resources. This period will be characterised by geo-political upheavals and manoeuvres and Africa

must consolidate itself as geographic political and economic bloc. With so many balancing centres of powers with undefined self-interests, Africa must have a single global agenda that will not be subject to the whims and moods of these centres of influence.

Africa accounts for one fifth of the world population and is endowed with natural resources that the balancing centres powers eagerly need to generate growth in their economies. The African Renaissance, which is driven by African Union and its economic programme NEPAD needs more urgent attention. Through NEPAD Africa should look at a possibility of identifying strategic natural resources that will be crucial to drive global economic growth and collectively as a continent negotiate terms of commerce and trade of these natural resources. Strategic partnership and competition among African countries and regions should be encouraged; however, ill-begotten competition will virtually expose the continent to abuse.

Whilst multipolarity means increased opportunities in trade and commerce, Africa must go beyond that and establish strategic relations and partnerships with the balancing powers that will advance our progressive agenda for a just world and fasten transformation of global governance institutions. This will give a united Africa an opportunity to take radical stances and call for an overhaul of global governance institutions, as these are post-World War II institutions mainly shaped to advance the agenda of the West.

Country based strategic relations by individual African countries will badly expose the continent to further abuse by global powers. There is not much strategic value that any African countries can derive from hopping the world through individual crusade advancing a country-based interest. Such countries will just end up being on the demand or supply side of the balancing centres of powers, with very insignificant or no strategic value at all to the continent.

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A DIFFERENT KIND OF ANC:

Learning from history

By KOGLANE RUDOLPH PHALA



Every time we debate organizational renewal and review, we must always bear in mind that ANC must at all times be fit to the tasks of the day. As we said in 1997 that, "the character of the ANC must be determined by the nature of the care tasks that confront the National Democratic Revolutions (NDR) in our Country in any specific historical time" (ANC.1997). The ANC we have today is an heir and descendant of, but very different creature from the one founded by our forefathers in 1912. That ANC celebrates 100 years in 2010. What makes the ANC today different from the one our forbearers founded in 1912? The crucible of the struggle of the 1940s reshaped, refashioned and moulded the ANC into a giant national liberation movement responsible for the escalation of the freedom struggle into the era of defiance, mass campaigns,

mass membership, alliance relations, pickets, boycotts, marches, stay-at-homes, azikhwelwa, strikes, rural uprisings and resistance which were unknown to the ANC in 1912.

It is decades of existence the ANC got shaped and reshaped by demands of the moment. Future generations and struggles would mould and remould an ANC fitting demands of the moment. When we do organisational renewal of the ANC, we must always bear that into account. The Polokwane conference articulated this matter eloquently, that, "over the 95 years of the existence of the ANC, the movement evolved into a force for mass mobilisation, a glue that held our people together and a trusted leader of the broadest range of social forces that share the vision of a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous South Africa. That historical evolution has been largely due to

the movement's distinct character and unique features that have enabled it to overcome adversity and the daunting challenges it faced throughout its near-century of existence. The preservation of the movement's character, culture and values in a changing context and new conditions of struggle is the central focus of the organisational renewal effort in the run-up to the centenary of the ANC in 2012."

ANC FOUNDATION

The ANC was founded on 08 January 1912, on the bedrock of uniting the African people against white-minority rule. It was established and led by early African Intellectuals whose methods of struggle were purely constitutional and legalistic. Its membership and leadership were composed almost entirely of intellectuals, teachers, priests, lawyers and chiefs. These categories of people constituted an elite of those days. Their approach to the fight for rights was therefore moderate and can be said to be also elitist. It was a body essentially of civilised men who fought for the right to a vote for civilised men. Their strategy and tactics included to fight for adult African male franchise through sending memoranda, petitions and deputations to both Pretoria and the Crown in England. They acted in the name of and on behalf of both themselves and the majority downtrodden, voteless, voiceless, African masses.

They were pioneers and pathfinders in a long and gargantuan struggle for liberation of Africans in particular and Blacks in general. Their words as true as when they were said that, "the demon of racialism, the aberrations of the Xhosa-fingo feud, the animosity that exists between the Zulus and the Tongaas, between the Basutos and every other Native must be buried and forgotten; it has shed among us sufficient blood. We are one people. These divisions, these jealousies, are the cause of all our woes and of all our backwardness and ignorance today."

Pixley Ka Isaka Seme, Sol Plaatje, John Dube, Walter Rubusana, Sefako Makgatho, Thomas Maphikela, Alfred Mangena, John Tengo Jabavu, Meshack Pelem, Montsioa individually and collectively were a product of and contributed to the further evolution of embryonic African national consciousness. This evolution had originated in a previous decades because of the development of early independent African Churches, the emergence of early African intellectuals, the foundations of first African newspapers, the development of early African political organisation, the forced proletarianisation of Africans with the discovery of diamond in Kimberly and gold on the Reef, and the defeat in the wars of resistance.

The ANC they founded was not a mass movement both in its composition and its strategy and tactics at birth in 1912 and for many decades thereafter. And this is how the ANC itself explains why in its character and methods of struggles it was different in 1912 that in 1950s or 1960s: "In 1913 the enemy was different from our enemy today. Our forefathers were different from us. The conflicts between British and Boer and therefore between English-speaking and Afrikaans speaking Whites, were sharper than they are today and this gave rise to a hope-real or unreal- that Britain might concede to the please of the Africans. The social composition of the ANC and its leadership, which consisted mainly of ministers of religion and lawyers, and less working-class, was another reason. The African working class was still very weak at that time and this led the ANC to lack the necessary strength to take the bull by the horns."

That is why the ANC of those days was very surprised when its own president, Josiah Gumede returns from the tenth anniversary of the Red October Revolution in 1927 and says, "I have been to a new Jerusalem and I have seen the World that is to come where it has already begun." And that is why some unprophetic and myopic elements in the CPSA were able to say in 1929 that, "The ANC, which the resolution want us to boost up, "is a moribund body, it has had its day."

That is why it is important that every time we do organisational renewal of the ANC we remember that, "the ANC emerged as a product of a historical moment in the evolution of resistance against colonialism, a subjective expression of an objective historical movement for change. At each stage of the development of this historical movement, the ANC's leadership and cadreship were able to adapt to the demands of the moment, mobilise the people and place the organization at the head of popular resistance. Thus the organisation developed as a people's movement in theory and in practice, recognising that a leadership role is earned, and not decreed."

There are certain fundamental questions that must be addressed for a successful renewal. Those include, "for how long will the anc survive as the leading force for progressive change in our Country and continent? What are the identifiable threats to the longevity and durability? What should be done by current generations to ensure that future generations inherit the type of ANC that continues to represent the interests of the majority in society? Addressing these long term concerns is the central focus of organisational renewal." One of the central issues is that the ANC must transform or get rid of comrades who benefit from an ANC in crisis, turmoil and chaos, otherwise the turnaround may be either very difficult or impossible

ANC MOULDED IN THE 1940'S

The crucible of the struggle in the 1940s moulded, refashioned and reshaped the ANC to an extent where by the 1950s it was a totally different ANC in composition, posture and strategy and tactics. "The slow transformation of the ANC from a moderate, petty bourgeois pressure group into a mass national liberation movement began in the 1940s under the leadership of a new president-general, Dr. A.B. Xuma." This happened because, "no political movement or party is born with ready-made values, character, principles and culture. They are forged and tempered in the concrete conditions of struggle. A vibrant organisational culture and acceptable practices are also developed over time and tested in practice during the course of dealing with and resolving problems." Many factors collaborated in the redetermination of the ANC in the 1940s. Those included:-

A world war: The Second World War was being fought between 1939-1945 in which the country took an active role and many recruits were inducted. Armament factories grew and there was mobilisation for people to take part in the war. As historians say, "The development of a mass, militant working class movement during the war pushed the African petty bourgeois into ever more radical positions."

The formation of ANC Womens' League in 1943 and the Youth League in 1944: The establishment of the League added the necessary impetus and oomph to the freedom struggle. Their role thereafter is very significant and critical to the life of the ANC. "The Congress Youth League (CYL) stressed that white domination would only be overthrown by mass struggles and African self-assertion – a radical departure from the ANC's constitutionalism."

The restructuring of the ANC itself: President A.B. Xuma led a project to reorganise and restructure the ANC. The ANC established branches and had mass membership which were clearly emphasised. "A new democratic constitution was adopted in 1943, together with ANC's first comprehensive political programme. This demanded a redistribution of the land and 'full political rights' – the first time that the ANC had effectively demanded a universal, non-racial franchise."

Passive resistance campaign by Indians: Our Indian compatriots led by the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) and the Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC) conducted massive passive resistance campaigns. They involved ordinary working class Indian people in the struggle for their own liberation. After learning from the Indian congresses, in later years, "the ANC was to be transformed into a mass organisation through the example of passive resistance."

The 1946 Mineworkers strike: ANC also learned lessons from the powerful 1946 Mineworkers strike led by the African Mineworkers Union (AMU) of JB Marks. It was the first large scale workers revolt by Africans in the Country. The strike was so huge and successful that the regime had to use massive military force to stem it. As the ANC would say, "75000 African mineworkers in 21 Mines on the Witwatersrand came out on strike for higher wages. As in 1920s troops were called in to drive the miners back in the mines at bayonet point. Thirteen strikers were killed and 1200 injured. Fifty trade union officials were arrested and put on trial."

The reality of urban Africans: The unintended consequence of forced proletarianisation of Africans was that by 1940s there was a reality of large numbers of Africans in Urban Centres staying in huge squatter settlement and townships. Also

critical was that the rapid industrialisation of the 1920s and 1930s had brought big numbers of African workers into the urban areas into industrial plants, domestic work and service industries. That is why the ICU at its peak was able to represent a 100 000 workers. The initial idea was that Africans would only be in urban centres to work in white factories and mines, otherwise they are not needed there. These Africans were a political force in their own right and fought many political battles of the day.

Formation of African trade unions: By the 1940s there was a reality of African trade unions that organised African workers, like the AMU, the garment workers union (GWU), the food and canning workers union and others. Their existence and the work they did of conscientisation, mobilisation and organisation of African workers was very significant in the political milieu of the day.

The 1949 ANC National Conference: The ANC's 1949 National Conference in which Dr. J.S. Moroka was elected president and there was adoption of a militant programme of action sponsored by the Youth League is very significant to its own reshaping. It was a watershed conference in the evolution of the ANC and the shaping of a different kind of ANC.

The Dadoo-Xuma-Naicker Pact: As the Indian resistance intensified the ANC decided to work with them in a common struggle against a common oppressor. A meeting between ANC president Dr. Xuma, NIC president Dr. G.M. Naicker and TIC president Dr. Yusuf Dadoo was held in 1947, to look at areas of working together between compatriots. This historic meeting is also referred to as the Three Doctors Meeting. It is the real root of the revolutionary alliance that we have up to this day. It planted seeds of broad front politics in the ANC.

The Atlantic Charter, the African claims and the UN Declaration of Human Rights: The most direct consequence of the adoption of the Atlantic Charter by the Allies was the conception of the African claims document and its proclamation by ANC's Annual Conference in 1943. The document was the first document adopted by ANC to clearly articulate its demands for one-man-one-vote and the abolition of the colour bar. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in 1945 accelerated the freedom struggles all over the world, particularly in the colonies and semi colonies, including our own. It put foundation for the ultimate demands articulated in the Freedom Charter in 1955.

All these various and different factors, both exogenous and endogenous, collaborated to create new conditions for the conduct of struggle. Change in the conditions of struggle itself contributed to the evolution of a new kind of ANC – an ANC that mobilised people to fight; that had a mass membership; that fight for a South Africa in which there is

a universal adult suffrage; and struggle to establish a non-racial, non-sexist, united, democratic and prosperous South Africa. As a consequence of the change in conduct of struggle, there was a concomitant change in the nature of ANC and face of freedom struggle. It is these subjective and objective factors that contributed to the building, the evolution, and the emergence of a different kind of ANC. The 1950's are therefore referred as the roaring fifties in history of resistance.

THE 1950'S CHANGED THE ANC

The creature we have today as an ANC was formed in 1912, but evolved out 1940s and got significantly shaped by the struggles of the 1950s. Those characteristic features it gained in the 1950s includes:-

A mass organisation: The forces and the faces that moulded the ANC in 1950s turned it into a mass membership organisation. It became an ANC that truly and fully believed in the centrality of the people. Its central tenet became that the people are their own liberators. Mass conscientisation, mobilisation and organisation became the order of the day throughout the 1950s. ANC led the people in every democratic demand and campaign of the struggle. The creature we have today as an ANC was formed in 1912, but evolved out 1940s and got significantly shaped by the struggles of the 1950s. Those characteristic features it gained in the 1950s includes:-

Broad front politics – the Alliance: The ANC in the 1950s also accepted the correctness of working in Alliance with other forces in a common struggle. It led the Congress Alliance composed of the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the South African Coloured Peoples Organisation (SACPO), later renamed the Coloured Peoples Congress (CPC), the Congress Of Democrats (COD), later joined by the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). These organisations led the struggles in the 1950s, including, the Defiance of Unjust Laws campaign and the Demand of the People campaign for the Freedom Charter. In fact that historic and heroic congress of the people held on 25 – 26 June 1955 was convened by the Congress Alliance. It is these broad front politics of 1950s that led to a heightened intensity of the struggle. It proved that working together as various forces, from different angles strengthened our hand in the fight for a new South Africa.

The introduction of defiance: The 1950s also introduced something new and qualitatively different to the freedom struggle – defiance. In that way the struggle transcended from protest to challenge. Once introduced defiance brought in a new dimension in the general approach to the

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struggle. Defiance itself changed the ANC and tilted the power balance in favour of the revolutionary forces. The 1952 Defiance campaign had, "aimed to clog the jails, bring the administration of unjust laws to a halt, and to demonstrate to the people the effectiveness of mass non-violent action. The campaign had a number of important political effects. Firstly, it did generate mass support for the ANC. Within a few months its membership rose from 7000 to nearly 100 000. Secondly, it saw the beginnings of organised joint actions with other political groupings. This eventually gave rise to the Congress Alliance under the leadership of the ANC. Thirdly, the Defiance campaign stimulated strategic rethinking by part of the ANC leadership, particularly the group around the president of the Transvaal ANC, Nelson Mandela. Mandela argued that the ANC must prepare the basis for semi-underground work and put forward the 'M-plan' for the reorganisation of the movement. And fourthly, the Defiance Campaign demonstrated the need for a new, popular programme of demands, which would go beyond the programme of action. The latter gave rise to the convening of the Congress of the People by the Congress Alliance in June 1955."

The introduction of defiance to the struggle was so revolutionary that even freedom songs of the day changed in both rhythm and words to proclaim the new situation that has evolved. Instead of signing *Senzeni naa*, you can now sing *Naants' Ndod emnyama Verwoerd!* Instead of just clapping hands you can now dance with our feet, fists in the air, in song! A new political climate had developed in the country.

Clarity about the future: The adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1955 brought about the necessary clarity in a future South Africa being fought for. The struggle is no longer just for a vote for civilised men, but the demands as enumerated in the Freedom Charter. The Freedom Charter clearly articulated a type of South Africa to be established once white-minority rule is defeated. The Freedom Charter itself became a beacon of hope of the entire struggling people of South Africa. The ANC itself adopted the Freedom Charter in its conference in 1956. The strategic objective had evolved from 1912 to a qualitatively clearer and better one.

Forms of struggle: The new forms of struggle introduced by the roaring fifties impacted on the character of the ANC. Those forms were to a large extent unknown to both the ANC and the struggle. Once the ANC tasted them it never looked back. Those forms included – Marches, pickets, boycotts, stay-at-homes, azikhwelwa, demonstrations, rural uprisings, defiance and protest.

ANC the movement: As a consequence of these struggles in the 1940's and 1950s the ANC evolved into a people's movements. It went beyond just being a political organisation to be an expression of the leadership of the struggling people as a whole. It led not just its membership but a variety of forces standing behind it. The ANC became a broad church leading all manner of forces in society.

All these factors collaborated to reshape ANC in the 1950s. As the ANC itself would say, "the organisation was therefore able to evolve with changing times, with drawn-out as well as sudden acts of internal renewal and redefinition when the situation so demanded."

THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ANC AFTER 1990

In 1990 when the ANC was unbanned it re-established its existence in the country. It re-awakened its structural presence across the length and breadth of South Africa. It rebuilt itself as it was in 1950s. As the ANC itself would say, that, "since the unbanning of the ANC in 1990, a great deal of effort and energy has been put into re-establishing the movement as a mass legal formation, restructuring and reorganising the structures of the ANC, changes to the duties and powers of organisational structures, the main streaming of gender in ANC structures, ensuring more effective disciplinary procedures and structures, strengthening and clarifying the role of branches, cadre development and defining the relationship between organisational and governance structures.

After 1990 it built campaigning branches on the ground, directly connected to the people. It also re-established the organisational presence of the women's League and the Youth League. This was because, "the 1991 Durban Conference had to grapple with major strategic and organisational questions that arose from the unbanning of the movement and release of political prisoners in the context of negotiations. The movement needed to integrate all its cadres – from the mass movement, und cohesive ground structures, prison and exile – into one coherent and cohesive organisation, with common strategic and tactical perspective on negotiations."

It shaped itself as a movement based on mass mobilisation for negotiations, peace, elections, and freedom. "In brief, the ANC seeks to be more than a party of mass support, and more than an electoral machine. It also seeks to be a movement of mass participation. The movement character of the ANC also relates to our long established traditions of building a "broad church", an "hegemonic" organisation that does not seek to define itself in exclusivist, or narrow

ideological terms. The ANC has been, and necessarily remains, home to a variety of progressive ideological currents-nationalist, Africanist, socialist- and of a variety of different classes and strata, all united behind a common commitment to national democratic transformation. The multi-class, multi-strata character of the ANC does not, however, mean that the ANC neglects the significance of class. More broadly the ANC, from its base amongst the historically oppressed, seeks to provide a broad leadership over the great majority of South Africans."

It also re-emphasised the centrality of the Alliance as an organ that touches every South African in all spheres. It revived the Congress Alliance, now called Tripartite Alliance with COSATU and the SACP. The various community organisations that sprang up in struggle in the 1980s were recognised by the evolution of SANCO as a partner in the Alliance. This is because, "our movement character also refers to the style in which, for many decades, the ANC has functioned. We have attempted to be a force for cohesion in the centre of a broad range of allied organisations, mass democratic and community based structures. We have, as the ANC, not undermined the ideological and organisational independence or autonomy of these organisations, but rather to interact with them, and fuse or combine their energies, constituencies and diverse capacities into a common national democratic purpose."

It reconfirmed the movement character of the ANC. That the ANC is not just its organisational structural arrangements, but a leader of a variety of forces of all kind. It is important that in discussing organisational renewal of the ANC we must always strive to "involve the membership in the resolution of critical questions facing the organisation! In instance where decisive action is required to introduce new approaches, or to deal with such problems as divisions, opportunism, corruption and soon, members should be involved in finding solutions – this is critical not only in terms of democratic principles, but it is an, important instrument of practical political education."

CONCLUSION

It is even true today that, "the many years that have passed since the democratic breakthrough of April 1994 have confirmed that the ANC must constantly adapt and renew its character. The character of our organisation is not some timeless reality. But these past years have also confirmed that the ANC, in assuming new responsibilities, must do so with a sense of the relevance of our historical and organisational reality that may well be an im-

portant model for progressive political organisation in the coming century."

In thinking about organisational review and renewal cadres of the movement must always bear into account that, "the ANC has evolved and developed into a people's movement and agent for change over many years of struggle and sacrifice. It had to overcome serious obstacles and set backs in the long road to freedom and democracy. Our movement has a track record of being a trusted leader and loyal servant of the people. Its strength lies in its ability to renew itself ideologically and organisationally, to take account of new developments and new challenges. However, this ability for self-renewal cannot be taken for granted. It is a task that every generation has to grapple with and accomplish, based on the requirement and tasks of each situation. Any organisational review and renewal proposals for the ANC have to pass one test: to what extent do they enhance the capacity of the movement to remain a trusted leader, loyal servant of the people and an agent for change! This is the main challenge."

And that is the main challenge! The building of a different kind of ANC fit to conditions of the moment and the future. And that is the task that is never finished.

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